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THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP TAX SHELTER:
AN INVESTMENT VEHICLE UNDER ATTACK
JExFREY

D.

SPERLNG*

and

LAWRENCE LoKEN**

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, individuals with high incomes have turned with increasing
frequency to tax shelter investments as means of maximizing after-tax income.
Apartment complexes, convalescent hospitals, motion pictures, shopping
centers, cattle feeding operations, oil and gas ventures and many other investment opportunities have been widely touted as potential tax shelters.'
Congressional efforts to limit the tax savings resulting from such investments
have also proliferated. 2

0 B.A., 1970, University of California at Riverside; J.D., 1973, University of Southern
California; LL.M. in Taxation, 1975, University of Florida; Member of the State Bar
of California.
* B.A., 1960, Augsburg College; J.D., 1967, University of Minnesota; Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida.
The authors acknowledge the able research assistance provided by James L. George, a
student at the University of Florida College of Law.
1. See, e.g., Durham, Farm and Farming: Gentlemen Farmers, New Hobby Loss Rules;
Holding Period; etc., N.Y.U. 29TH INsT. ON FED. TAx. 1527 (1971); Georges, Timber as a
Tax Shelter: What are the Benefits and are there Drawbacks, 36 J. TAX. 364 (1972); Shelburne, Tax Shelters via Limited Partnershipsin the Oil and Gas Area, 36 J. TAx. 246 (1972);
Tax Shelter for the Individual: A Panel Discussion, N.Y.U. 28TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1009
(1970); Zarrow, Tax Shelters and the Public-New Uses for Limited Partnerships and
Joint Ventures, U. S. CAL. TAX INsr. 277 (1970).
2. Numerous provisions aimed directly or indirectly at tax shelters are found in the
Tax Reform Acts of 1969 and 1976. They reflect at least three approaches to the problem.
Some of the provisions directly modify tax accounting and other rules of the law which
allow the distortions which tax shelters exploit. The 1976 Act, for example, added §189
to the Code to require that interest and real property taxes paid or accrued during
the construction phase of a building or other real property improvement be capitalized
in large part and amortized over a period of years. See note 7 infra. Section 167(j) was
added to the Code in 1969 to limit uses of accelerated methods of depreciation with
respect to real estate. Other provisions are designed to remedy the distortions by imposing
overall limitations on deductions of various types. For example, §465 of the Code, which
was added in 1976, limits loss deductions from certain motion picture, farming, leasing
and oil and gas investments to the amounts a taxpayer has placed at risk in such a venture.
The 1969 Act dded and the 1976 Act strengthened §163(d) of the Code which places
dollar limits on deductions for interest on borrowings obtained or continued to purchase
or carry investments. The minimum tax imposed by §56 of the Code, added in 1969 and
amended in 1976, reflects a third approach. It is a separate tax, imposed in addition to the
general income tax, which is intended to insure that persons availing themselves of various
tax minimizing devices do not wholly escape the burden of taxes.
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While public attention has been focused on the marketing of tax shelter
investments and the legislative attempts to curb them, the Internal Revenue
Service has carried on a quieter crusade to restrict the usefulness of the form
of organization most often used to package tax shelter investments - the
limited partnership. Tax shelter projects are frequently organized as limited
partnerships because the tax laws generally allow partners to deduct their
distributive shares of partnership losses, while state laws governing limited
partnerships ordinarily insulate limited partners from liability for partnership
debts. To be useful as a tax shelter vehicle, a limited partnership must be
recognized as a partnership for tax purposes. In recent years the Service has
steadily narrowed the class of cases in which it will rule that an organization
formed as a limited partnership will be treated as a partnership for tax
purposes rather than as an association taxable as a corporation.3 After almost
25 years of inactivity, the government recently litigated two cases in which
it contended that certain limited partnerships should be classified as associations.4 Although the significance of the rulings policy of the Service is unclear
and the two litigated cases have been decided against the government, the
association issue remains a matter of concern to tax shelter promoters attracted
by the advantages of the limited partnership form.
This article discusses the evolving standards applied to distinguish limited
partnerships from corporations for tax purposes. It also looks at a few other
arrows drawn from the Service's quiver that have recently been aimed at
tax shelters organized as limited partnerships.
A SuRVEY OF THE IssuEs

The tax shelter label can aptly be applied to any investment that causes
an investor's taxable income to differ from an economically realistic measure
of his current income. Income is sheltered from tax, for example, when
economic income is excluded from gross income. The statutory exclusion
of interest on state and local bonds is the most widely used shelter of this
form. A tax shelter can also be based on provisions of the law allowing
deductions that do not represent costs actually incurred. Percentage depletion,6 to the extent allowed in amounts exceeding the cost of depleted assets,
is the most notorious example of such a shelter device.
3. Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 CUM. BULL. 438; Rev. Proc. 72-18, 1972-1 Cur. BuLL. 735.
4. Phillip G. Larson, 66 T.C. No. 21 (Apr. 27, 1976); Zuckman v. United States, 524
F.2d 729 (Ct. Cl. 1975). The last preceding case in which the issue was litigated was
Western Construction Co., 14 T.C. 453 (1950), aff'd, 191 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1951).
5. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 108.
6. The deduction for depletion was initially allowed to permit the costs of mineral
deposits as offsets against receipts from the sale of minerals extracted. In theory, depletion

is a mechanism for spreading the costs of long lived assets over the periods during which

they contribute to the production of income. Present law, however, allows extractors of

most minerals to claim as depletion deductions fixed percentages of gross income from
extraction operations. Id. §l§611, 613. The amounts so allowed in a given period often
vary widely from any reasonable estimate of the cost of minerals extracted during the
period. The amounts allowed as percentage depletion over several years may exceed a
taxpayer's total cost for the mineral deposits 'he owns, Such excesses are deductions without
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To be a valuable tax planning tool, however, an investment need not yield
economic income permanently exempted from tax. A delay in the imposition
of a tax operates much like an interest free loan from the taxing authority.
An income tax may be deferred by delaying the time of reporting gross
income or by accelerating the time deductions are allowed. Many tax
shelters operate principally as deferral devices. For example, when current
deductions are allowed for interest paid on loans obtained to finance the
construction of a building,7 for depredation on a building in amounts
exceeding the economic costs of current usage of the building,8 or for grain
cost and create obvious shelter opportunities. The form of percentage depletion best known
to the public, that allowed in the oil and gas industry, was greatly restricted, however, by
the addition of §613A to the Code in 1975. Major producers of oil are now generally
limited to depletion deductions based on cost. Percentage depletion has been retained
in a limited form for independent producers and the retention leaves oil and gas as a
popular tax shelter investment. That popularity may be somewhat changed by the "at
risk" limitation of §465 of the Code, added in 1976, which applies to oil and gas investments.
7. The costs of acquiring or constructing an asset having a useful life extending
substantially beyond the taxable year may not be deducted as incurred because they do
not represent expenses of producing income presently recognized. TREAs. REG. §l.263(a)-2(a).
If the asset acquired or constructed is an exhausting asset, however, such costs may be
deducted as depreciation over the periods the asset is used in business or for the production
of income. ITrr. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, §167. In a realistic sense the costs of financing the
construction of a building are as much a part of the total cost of the completed structure
as are the costs of the bricks and mortar. They are costs incurred for the production
of income over the period the taxpayer owns and uses the building and are not intended
to generate income currently. Real property taxes for periods during which a building is
constructed can similarly be viewed as capital in nature rather than as current expenses.
Prior to 1976, however, all interest and real property taxes were deductible when paid
or accrued. Id. §§163, 164. Construction period interest and taxes provided extensively used
shelter opportunities to real estate investors.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 added §189 to the Code to require interest and taxes
paid or accrued during the construction of real property improvements to be amortized
ratably over a period of years which will eventually be ten years. Id. §189(b). The
provision stops short, however, of recognizing such interest and taxes as indistinguishable
parts of the cost of a completed structure. The ten-year amortization period is much
shorter than the useful lives of most real property improvements. Interest and taxes
will still be allowed, therefore, over shorter periods than are applied in determining
depreciation rates for other capital costs. The first installment of the amortization of
interest and taxes is deductible in the year paid or accrued, in contrast to depreciation
deductions for other costs which commence only when a structure is available for service.
Id. §189(c)(1). The second installment of the amortization deduction is delayed, however,
to the year in which the property is ready to be placed in service. Id. Also, the amortization
rules will be phased in over an extended period. The amortization period is initially
four years and will be ten years for all types of property only in taxable years beginning
after 1987. Id. §189(6). Residential real property is not subject to the rules until 1978 and
certain low income housing investments are relieved of the limitations until 1982. Id.
8. The deduction for depreciation is a mechanism which spreads the cost of a long
lived asset over the period of its use in business or for the production of income. Conceptually, the mechanism should be structured solely to serve the goal of matching related
items of income and deductions. Section 167(b) of the Code allows accelerated methods
of depreciation, however, which have been permitted, in part, as a means of stimulating
capital investment. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1954). Accelerated depreciation of real estate has been limited, INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, §167(j), but is still a
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to be fed to cattle held [or sale in future periods, 9 the deductions allowed
presently are expenses of producing income to be recognized later. As a
result, an investment may generate losses for tax purposes even though it
is economically profitable. Such losses may generally be taken as deductions
against unrelated income of the investor. 0 The benefit is usually transitory
since the acceleration of deductions in earlier years will dry the well and
cause taxable income to exceed economic income in later years. Nevertheless,
the deferral opportunity is a valuable one. Also, the day of reckoning can
be further delayed by a second tax shelter investment made when the first
plays out and may be avoided in whole or in part by the investor's death."
An investment device may also effect tax savings by indirectly converting
ordinary income into capital gains. The use of borrowed money to carry
investments in capital assets illustrates this technique. Interest on the loans
is generally deductible as paid, 12 but gains arising from the capital investments
are gross income only when the investments are sold. 13 In addition to the
deferral opportunity the device presents, the interest deductions, which are
allowed against unrelated ordinary income of the investor, are recouped
through gains realized by the sale of investments, which are taxed at the
powerful incentive to real estate investment. To the extent an accelerated depreciation
method allows an investor to deduct in one year an increment of cost which generates
income in a later year, a shelter opportunity exists.
9. Manufacturers and other producers of property are generally required to use
inventory methods of accounting which cause the costs of producing an item to be
allowed as an offset against receipts only in the year the item is sold. TEArs. REG. §§1.471-1,
1.61-3(a). Farmers generally are not subject to such requirements and may use a cash
method of accounting under which costs of production are deducted when incurred.
Id. §1.61-4(a). Costs presently incurred to produce future income are thereby allowed as
current deductions. A tax shelter investor in a farming venture may usually determine
his income and loss from the venture as a farmer. However, corporations and partnerships
with corporations as partners must use an accrual method of accounting. INTr. REV. CODE
OF 1954, §447.
10. If the investment is of a type subject to the at risk limitation of §465 of the
Code, however, losses exceeding the investor's capital contribution and personal liability
on debt may not be deducted against other income. Also, costs incurred in an activity
not carried on for profit may be deducted only to the extent of gross income generated
by the activity. Irr. REV. CODE OF 1954, §183(b). Losses created by artificial acceleration
of deductions do not, however demonstrate a lack of profit motive. Cf. Id. §183(c).
11. Although an investor's death ends his existence as a taxpayer, his estate or
beneficiaries may later pay the price for his tax shelter investments. The basis rules for
property passing from a decedent may significantly lower that price, however. Generally,
a decedent's successors take the decedent's basis for his property if he dies after December
31, 1976. Id. §1023(a)(1). However, there are many exceptions to the new carryover basis
rule. If property was held on December 31, 1976, for example, its basis is increased at
his death by any appreciation in the value of the property prior to that date.
Id. §1023(h). If an acceleration of deductions prior to a decedent's death is reflected by
a lowering of his basis for property, any step-up in basis occurring at his death may
convert the deferral into a forgiveness.
12. Id. §163(a). If interest is prepaid for any period beyond the taxable year of payment, however, it must be capitalized and deducted only as the interest obligation
accrues. Id. §461(g).
13. Id. §1001(a).
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preferential capital gains rates.' 4 Investments in depreciable real estate can
effect another type of conversion of ordinary income into capital gain. Depreciation deductions are allowed against ordinary income. 15 When depreciable real property is sold, any gain realized represents at least in part
a recoupment of depredation deductions previously taken. Such deductions
are only partially recaptured as ordinary income,' 6 and any remaining gain is
17
usually taxed as capital gain.
The utility of many tax shelter investments is greatly enhanced by the
use of borrowed money. For example, if an investor acquires a building
and pays the purchase price of $10x wholly from his own funds, the depreciation deduction allowed him each year will be a small fraction of his investment. If the investor combines his funds with borrowed moneys of 590x,
however, aggregate depreciation allowed with respect to the building he
acquires for $100x may quickly exceed the investor's equity in the building.
In general, when costs incurred are allowed as deductions, the deductions,
as a percentage of the equity of an investor, are increased as the portion
of the costs paid from borrowed moneys is increased. Many economically
profitable tax shelter investments yield annual losses for tax purposes of
fifty percent or more of the equity placed at risk by the investors. Therefore,
a tax shelter investor can often recoup his equity in three or four years solely
through the tax savings flowing from the deduction of losses generated by his
investment. The leverage principle just discussed is at the heart of that
phenomenon.
The nature of most tax shelter investors and investments requires aggregations of investors and professional management. A typical tax shelter investor,
although among the most affluent group of the population, does not have
the capital necessary to acquire sole ownership of the real estate developments, cattle feeding operations, movie productions and other activities
and properties most often sold as tax shelter investments. And, most of the
professional persons and corporate executives who form the largest group
of tax shelter investors have little interest in becoming real estate managers,
farmers or movie producers. As a consequence, a tax shelter venture is often
14. Id. §§1201, 1202.
15. Id. §167.

16. Section 1250 of the Code generally provides that gain recognized on the sale
of real property is ordinary income to the extent that accelerated depreciation deductions
have been taken in amounts exceeding the deductions allowable by a straight line method
of depreciation. Id. §1250(a), (b). The amount so recaptured is reduced, however, for
certain classes of real estate held for substantial periods of time. Id. §1250(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B),

(a)(3)(B).
17. If the property sold was used in the taxpayer's trade or business and was held

for more than six months, any gain or loss recognized (apart from that characterized by
§1250) will be subject to the rule of §1231. The latter provision requires an aggregation

of gains and losses subject to its terms. If the transactions occurring during the taxable
year, in the aggregate, yield a gain, then all gains and losses are deemed long term capital
gains and losses. Otherwise they all are ordinary. When a gain or loss recognized in the
sale of real estate is not subject to §1231, it will, to the extent not governed by §1250, be
capital unless the property was held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of

business. Id.
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comprised of a group of persons who have combined as investors in a project
managed by others.
The choice of the form in which the investor group is to be organized
is a crucial decision. If the shelter from tax arises from deductions allowed
against unrelated income, it is essential that the deductions be allowable
to the investors on their individual returns. If the investment is heavily
leveraged, it is usually deemed equally important that the investors not be
personally liable on debt incurred. The tax rules applicable to general
partnerships provide that partnership losses are treated as losses of the
partners individually,18 but a partner of a general partnership is personally
liable for all debts of the partnership.19 Use of the corporate form of
organization insulates investors from liability for business debts, 20 but deductions arising from corporate expenditures are generally not allowed to shareholders.21 The limited partnership has been found to be the form of organization most generally suitable for tax shelter investments. If deemed a limited
partnership for tax purposes, such an entity is subject to the tax rules
generally applied to partnerships and partnership losses are allowed as deductions to the partners. If properly organized and managed as a limited partnership under state law, the limited partners are not liable on partnership
22
obligations.
A limited partnership must have a general partner and that partner has
unlimited liability for partnership debts. 23 An individual who becomes a
general partner of a heavily leveraged limited partnership therefore assumes
18. Id. §702(a).
19. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr [hereinafter cited as UPA] §15. The UPA has been
adopted in 49 states and territories and the District of Columbia and statutes corresponding
to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act [hereinafter cited as ULPA] are in force in 51
jurisdictions. Throughout this article discussions of state laws governing partnerships will
generally be limited to the UPA and the ULPA.
20. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §607.074 (1975).
21. Subchapter S of the Code provides a limited exception to the proposition stated
in text. If a small business corporation as defined in §1371 makes an election satisfying
§1372(a), its undistributed taxable income and net operating losses are reported on the
returns of its shareholders. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§1373, 1374. The subchapter S rules
contain certain limitations, however, which restrict their usefulness in masy tax shelter
contexts. A corporation with more than ten shareholders, for example, is not a small
business corporation and hence may not make a valid election under subchapter S.
Id. §1371(a)(1). (The permissible number of shareholders is increased to 15 after a
corporation has been subject to subchapter S for five years. Id. §13272(e)). The election of
a small business corporation to be subject to the subchapter S rules is terminated when
more than twenty percent of its gross receipts in any year are derived from rents and
other passive sources. Id. §1372(e)(5). A shareholder of a subchapter S corporation may
not deduct his share of net operating losses to the extent it exceeds the basis of the
shares and notes of the corporation he holds. Id. §1374(c)(2). An organization may be a
partnership for tax purposes regardless of the number of its partners or the sources of its
income. And, although a partner may not deduct partnership losses in amounts exceeding
the basis of his partnership interest, id. §704(d), liabilities of a partnership increase the
bases of the partners' interests, making it less likely that any partner will run out of
basis. Id. §752(a).
22. ULPA §7.
23. ULPA §9(1); UPA §15.
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a heavy burden. The burden is often avoided, however, by using a corporation as general partner.2 4 When a minimally capitalized corporation acts as
sole general partner of a limited partnership, partnership creditors are
effectively limited to recourse solely against partnership assets. Even when a
corporate general partner has a substantial net worth, liability for partnership
debts is restricted.
A limited partnership serves its purpose as a tax shelter medium only
if it is treated as a partnership for tax purposes. If it is classified as a corporation, the loss deductions which are the motive for the investment are not
available to the partners. From the beginning, the income tax statutes have
defined the word "corporation" to include "associations. ' 25 In Morrissey v.
Commissioner2e the Supreme Court established that the word "association"

includes any organization, however labeled by state law, that resembles a
corporation more than any other type of entity recognized by the tax law.
2
An organization formed as a limited partnership may be an association. 7
In their exposition of the corporate resemblance test of the Morrissey
case, the present regulations identify the following characteristics that distinguish corporations from other forms of organization: (1) associates; (2) an
objective to carry on business and divide any resulting gains; (3) continuity
of life; (4) centralization of management; (5) limited liability; and (6) free
transferability of equity interests.2

Partnerships and corporations share two

of the enumerated characteristics, associates and an objective to carry on
business and divide the gains. These are not helpful, therefore, in distinguishing partnerships from corporations, and the regulations require that they
be ignored when the issue is whether an entity is a partnership or an association.2 1 An entity is deemed an association under the tests of the regulations
if it possesses more than one half of the corporate characteristics taken into
account 2 0 An entity organized as a partnership under state law will be an
24. A corporation may be a partner, general or limited, under the laws of most
states. The UPA defines a partnership as "an association of two or more persons,"
UPA §6(l), and includes corporations within its definition of "person." UPA §2. The
UPA applies to limited partnerships except where the ULPA is inconsistent with it, UPA

§6(2), and the latter is silent on this issue. The only impediment to a corporation being
a partner is the doctrine, which may still be the law in a few states, that a corporation
acts ultra vires by undertaking to be a partner. See J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, THE LAw OF
PARTNERstuPs 52-55 (1968).
25. INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, §7701(a)(3). The history of the statute is traced in
Scallen, Federal Income Taxation of Professional Associations and Corporations, 49 MrNN.
L. REv. 603, 609-23 (1965). The word "partnership" is also defined in the statute. INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§761(a), 7701(a)(2). That definition, however, serves principally to
distinguish partnerships from mere joint ownership of property and other groups which
are not organized as joint undertakings for profit. See TREAs. REG. §1.761-1(a). A tax shelter
venture organized under state law as a limited partnership can be assumed to be a partnership for tax purposes unless it is deemed an association.
26. 296 U.S. 344, 1936-1 U.S.T.C. 9020 (1935).
27. Giant Auto Parts, Ltd., 13 T.C. 307 (1949).
28.

TaaAs. REG. §501.7701-2(a)(1).

29. Id. §301.7701-2(a)(2).
80. Id. §301.7701-2(a)(3).
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association for tax purposes, therefore, if it has three or four of the following
characteristics: continuity of life, centralization of management, limited liability
and free transferability of interests. The seeming precision of the regulation
tests is weakened, however, by a statement that in some cases factors other
than those enumerated may be relevant. 31
The regulations contain several references to the application of the
corporate resemblance test to limited partnerships. The rules for limited
partnerships are derived in large part from the opinion of the Board of
Tax Appeals in Glensder Textile Co.,3 2 a case which arose in a context far
removed from the present usage of limited partnerships in tax shelter investments. The limited partnership there involved, a successor to an earlier
general partnership, was engaged in a mercantile business which was profitable
in all years at issue. The business was organized as a limited partnership
under a statute closely resembling the Uniform Limited Partnership Act to
allow the owners to make gifts of equity interests without admitting the
donees to the management group. The court held it to be a partnership for
tax purposes. Although the court recognized that some limited partnerships
may properly be classified as associations 33 the tests applied in the opinion
would characterize most of them as partnerships.
Following that lead, the regulations indicate that a limited partnership
formed under a statute following the pattern of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act will be deemed an association only in unusual circumstances. Read
literally, the regulations provide that two of the four relevant characteristics,
continuity of life and limited liability, may never be possessed by a limited
partnership. 34 Since an entity is an association only if it has more corporate
attributes than it lacks, the regulations can be construed to say that a limited
partnership is an association only when factors other than the four principal
characteristics are present in sufficient force to turn the scales.
Rulings recognizing limited partnerships as partnerships were issued rather
freely prior to 1969, and the experience of practitioners in dealing with the
Service seemed generally to confirm that limited partnerships would almost
always be deemed partnerships for tax purposes. During 1969 or 1970, however, the Service began applying previously unmentioned criteria in passing
upon ruling requests.3 5 The criteria were not then stated in any published
pronouncement and became known to practitioners only through direct
dealings with the Service and by word of mouth. Knowledge so acquired
was unreliable because the attitudes of the Service seemed to be in a state
of flux.
The first public announcement of the change in climate was Revenue
Procedure 72-13.36 It states several conditions, each of which must be
satisfied before the Service will rule favorably on the status of a limited
Id. §301.7701-2(a)(1).
46 B.T.A. 176 (1942), acquiesced in, 1942-1 Cum. BULL. 8.
46 B.T.A. at 183.
See text accompanying notes 72-73 and 116-129 infra.
35. See Points to Remember, 24 TAx LAWYER 666 (1971).
36. 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 735.
31.
32.
33.
34.
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partnership with a corporation as its only general partner. The conditions
imposed bear no obvious relationship to the criteria stated in the regulations. No ruling will issue, for example, if limited partners own more than
20 percent of the stock of the corporate general partner. 7 Also, the net worth
of the corporate general partner is required to satisfy a rigid numerical
standard31 Furthermore, the Procedure stopped short of clearing the waters
the Service had muddied by its change in position. It only provides rules
to be applied in passing upon ruling requests and does not state the standards
applied in auditing partnerships that do not satisfy the new rules. Applying
only when a corporation is the sole general partner of a limited partnership,
the Procedure provides no guidance for cases involving partnerships with two
or more corporate general partners, with individuals and corporations as
general partners, or with only individuals as general partners.
Soon after the issuance of Revenue Procedure 72-13 it became apparent
to practitioners that compliance with the criteria stated there and in the
regulations was not always sufficient to insure a favorable response to a
ruling request.3 9 Revenue Procedure 74-1740 confirmed that the earlier procedure had not exhausted the Service's creativity. The new procedure does
no more than describe cases in which the Service will and will not rule. It
does not purport to be an embroidery on the definition of association. Rather,
it is premised on a policy that the Service will not rule on the effect of a
transaction which has as "its principal purpose the reduction of federal taxes." 41
Pursuant to that policy the Procedure states that a ruling ordinarily will not
issue as to the status of a limited partnership when the general partners,
whether individual or corporate, do not have at least a one percent interest
in each item of partnership income, gain, deduction or loss.&4 2 It also provides
that the Service ordinarily will not rule if the partnerships' distributive shares
of partnership loss will exceed their equity contributions during the first two
43
years of the operation of a limited partnership.
More recently, the Tax Court in Phillip G. Larson4 and the Court of
Claims in Zuckman v. United States45 classified the limited partnerships before
the courts in those cases as partnerships, not associations, for tax purposes.
The partnerships, which were organized as tax shelter media, each failed
37. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 CuM. Bus_. 735.
38. Id. The procedure also imposes two other conditions of less general application.
A ruling will not issue if securities of the corporate general partner are offered as part
of a package including limited partnership interests. And the Service will rule only
when local statutes governing limited partnerships are complied with. Id.
39. Kanter, Real Estate Tax Shelters, Everything You Wanted to Know but Did not
Know What to Ask, 51 TAxEs 770, 780 (1973).
40. 1974-1 Ctr. BuLL.438.
41. Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 Cum. BuLL.438.
42. Id.
43. Id. The procedure also imposes a third condition of less general application
which precludes the issuance of a ruling when a person making a nonrecourse loan to a
limited partnership acquires an equity interest in the partnership as part of the loan
transaction. Id.
44. 66 T.C. No. 21 (Apr. 27, 1976).
45. 524 F.2d 729, 75-2 U.S.T.C. 9778 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
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to meet the rulings criteria stated in Revenue Procedures 72-13 and 74-17.
The court did not cite the procedures, but held the regulations, so long as
they remain in force, to be binding on the government. The regulations
were held to require partnership classification in the cases at hand. The
Tax Court opinion repeatedly emphasized, however, that the authority
which empowered the Treasury to promulgate the present regulations included power to amend them.46 The opinion also stated that given regulations
allowing more flexibility in their application, the court would have found
the limited partnerships before it to have been associations. 4 , It is evident
that the issues have not been put to rest.
THE REGULATIONS

The regulations describe four characteristics deemed relevant to the
distinction between corporations and partnerships: continuity of life,
centralization of management, limited liability, and free transferability of
interests. 48 In the absence of special circumstances making other factors
relevant, an entity organized as a partnership will be treated as a partnership for tax purposes and will not be deemed an association unless it
49
possesses more than two of the characteristics.
Continuity of Life
The legal existence of a corporation is not affected by the death, bankruptcy, or other change in the status of any shareholder or by an attempt
of a shareholder to withdraw from the corporation.50 As the Tax Court stated
in Phillip G. Larson, "a corporate shareholder's investment is locked in
unless liquidation is voted or he can find a purchaser to buy him out." 51 A
corporation, in sum, has continuity of life. A general partnership, on the
other hand, is dissolved by the death or bankruptcy of a partner or by a
partner's unilateral decision that it be dissolved. 52 Because dissolution of a
partnership entitles each partner to have the business wound up and his
interest liquidated, 53 "a partner can always opt out of continued participation
46. The court quotes a passage from Morrisey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 354-55,
1936-1 U.S.T.C. V9020, at 9244 (1935) that stated that the generality of the statutory
definition leaves much to be filled in by administrative construction and concluded:
"Nor can this authority be deemed to be so restricted that the regulations, once
issued, could not later be clarified so as to meet administrative exigencies or conform
to judicial decision." 66 T.C. No. 21 n.8 (Apr. 27, 1976). At a later point the court
referred to the quoted language as outlining "respondent's future possibilities." Id. at n.24.
47. 66 T.C. No. 21 (Apr. 27, 1976).
48.

TREAs. REG.

§301.7701-2(a)(1), (2).

49. Id. §301.7701-2(a)(3).
50. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §607.011(l)(a) (1975).
51. 66 T.C. No. 21 (Apr. 27, 1976).
52. UPA §31. A partner of a general partnership has the power to cause dissolution
of the partnership by his unilateral act even though he has agreed to remain a partner
for a fixed term and his withdrawal breaches his agreement and renders him liable in
damages. Id. §31(2).
53. UPA §38. The Act distinguishes between dissolution and termination. Dissolution
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in and exposure to the risks of the enterprise." 54 Partnerships generally do
55
not have continuity of life.
A limited partnership occupies intermediate ground in this respect. The
death, bankruptcy or purported withdrawal of a limited partner does not
dissolve a limited partnership,56 but the retirement, death, insanity or bankruptcy of a general partner does. 57 The regulations state that the possibility
of a limited partnership being dissolved by a change in a general partner's
status causes the partnership to lack the characteristic of continuity of life.
Because corporate existence may be either perpetual or limited in duration, 55 an agreement that a partnership will continue for a fixed term neither
negates nor creates continuity of life.60 A partner's undertaking to refrain
from all acts that would cause dissolution is also apparently irrelevant under
the regulations. Such an undertaking cannot be specifically enforced in many
instances. A general partner's retirement causes dissolution of a limited
of a partnership ends the mutual agency except for the purpose of completing transactions in progress and winding up partnership affairs. UPA §33. A dissolved partnership
remains in existence, however, until terminated by the winding up of its affairs. Id. §80.
54. 66 T.C. No. 21 (Apr. 27, 1976).
55. TREAS. REG. §301.7701-2(b)(1). The regulations look solely to the possibilities of
partnership dissolution in reaching this conclusion and the word termination is not used.
See note 53 supra. Termination is not an inevitable consequence of dissolution. When a
partner causes a dissolution in contravention of the partnership agreement, for example,
the other partners are entitled to continue the partnership business in the same name
and thereby avoid termination. UPA §38(2)(b). However, because only dissolution is
relevant under regulations, the power of a partner to cause dissolution by his withdrawal
causes general partnerships to lack continuity of life.
56. J. CRANE & A. BRomBERG, supra note 24, at 517-19. The ULPA unfortunately leaves
these matters to implication. Sections 19 and 21 provide rules governing the assignment
of a limited partner's interest and the death of a limited partner, respectively, and do
not suggest that either occurrence effects a dissolution. Section 20 provides that the retirement, death or insanity of a general partner causes dissolution, but there is no provision
stating or implying that any act or change in status of a limited partner has that effect.
57. Section 20 of the ULPA states that the death, retirement or insanity of a general
partner dissolves a limited partnership. The Court, in construing a California statute
that contains the provisions of the UPA and ULPA relevant to the issue, held that the
bankruptcy of a general partner also dissolves a limited partnership. Phillip G. Larson,
66 T.C. No. 21 (Apr. 27, 1976). Crane and Bromberg apparently agree. CRANE AND BROMaERG, supra, note 24 at 518. The UPA, the Tax Court noted, provides for dissolution on
the bankruptcy of any partner and states that it applies to limited partnerships "except
insofar as the statutearelating to such partnerships are inconsistent." UPA §§31(5), 6(2). Since
the ULPA does not specify the effect of bankruptcy of a general partner, the Tax Court
. The statutes do not compel
thought the UPA provision should apply. 66 T.C. at
that conclusion. Section 20 of the ULPA states that a limited partnership is dissolved
by the retirement, death or insanity of a general partner and it could be read to imply
that no other event affecting a general partner should have that effect. However, all of
the reasons for dissolution on the bankruptcy of a partner of general partnership apply to
the bankruptcy of a general partner of a limited partnership, since the rights and obligations of general partners are closely parallel in general and limited partnerships. ULPA
§9. Bankruptcy of a general partner of a limited partnership should therefore be viewed
as an event causing dissolution.
58. TRAs. 1Kr. §301.7701-2(b)(1).
59. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §607.011(l)(a) (1975).
60. TREAs. KREG.§301.7701-2(b)(3).
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partnership, for example, even though it is a breach of his obligations under
the partnership agreement. 61 It is a partner's power to effect a dissolution,
not his right to do so, that causes a partnership to lack the continuity
required by the regulations.62
Continuity is not created, furthermore, by provisions of a limited partnership agreement granting to the remaining partners or general partners a right
to continue the partnership after the retirement, death or insanity of a
general partner.6 3 In Glensder Textile Co. the Board of Tax Appeals
characterized such provisions as creating only a "contingent continuity of
existence," 6" and, like the author of the regulations, distinguished them from
the certainty of continuity provided by corporate law.
An unpublished Technical Advice Memorandum issued by the Service in
1972 held that a partnership agreement allowing limited partners to replace
a retiring general partner by less than a unanimous vote gives continuity
of life if the partnership cannot be terminated at the will of a general
partner. 65 The holding is not easily reconciled with the rules stated in the
regulations. Although a provision for electing a new general partner by
majority vote reduces the possibility of premature termination of a partnership, the focus of the regulations is on dissolution, not termination.66 Under
the California statute applied in the Memorandum the bankruptcy of a
general partner probably dissolves a limited partnership even though a procedure for replacing the bankrupt partner may avoid termination.67 Termination also could result from bankruptcy of a general partner, notwithstanding
the election procedure, if no candidates were proposed as replacements for
the general partner or if none received the needed majority vote. The Uni61. Section 20 of the ULPA states that a general partner's retirement causes dissolution, but does not define the word retirement. Although the UPA does not use the word
retirement, it provides that a partnership is dissolved "by the express will of any partner
at any time," even though that consequence is "in contravention of the agreement between
the partners." UPA §31(2). Since the UPA applies to limited partnerships except when
inconsistent with the ULPA, UPA §6(2), there seems little doubt that a general partner's
retirement in contravention of his agreement to continue for a fixed term would be
deemed to dissolve a limited partnership. Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729, 737,
1975-2 U.S.T.C. 9778, at 88,435 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
62. In describing the effect of an agreement that a partnership continue for a fixed
term, the regulations state: "Nevertheless, if, notwithstanding such agreement, any member
has the power under local law to dissolve the organization, the organization lacks continuity
of life." TREAS. REG. §301.7701-2(b)(3). The partnership involved in Zuckman v. United
States, 524 F.2d 729, 1975-2 U.S.T.C. 9778 (Ct. Cl. 1975), was a party to a loan guarantee agreement prohibiting acts which would dissolve the partnership. Although the relevant provisions
of the agreement were incorporated in the partnership agreement, the court found the
general partner had power to cause dissolution in violation of the agreement and held
the partnership lacked continuity of life. Id. at 737, 1975-2 U.S.T.C. at 88,435.
63. TREAs. REG. §301.7701-2(b)(1).
64. 46 B.T.A. 176, 185 (1942), acquiesced in, 1942-1 CuM. BULL. 8.
65. The Memorandum is reproduced in BIERMAN, Limnsnr
PARTNExSmPs 91-97 (1974).
66. See note 55 supra. The distinction between dissolution and termination is discussed
in note 53 supra.
67. Phillip G. Larson, 66 T.C. No. 21 (Apr. 27, 1976) so construed the statute. See
note 57 supra.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol29/iss1/1

12

Sperling and Lokken: The Limited Partnership Tax Shelter: An Investment Vehicle Under
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

form Limited Partnership Act, unlike the California statute applied in the
Memorandum, gives general partners the power to cause dissolutions in all
cases by their unilateral acts,68 and the author of the Memorandum conceded
its holding would not apply to partnerships organized under unmodified
enactments of the uniform act. Furthermore, Phillip G. Larson, a case governed
by the California statute involved in the Memorandum, held that continuity
of life was not created by a partnership agreement entitling limited partners,
by a majority of 51 percent in interest, to elect a successor general partner.69
The Service may also contend that continuity of life exists when the
remaining general partners of a limited partnership are required by agreement to continue the partnership after the withdrawal of any of them. Even
though such an agreement may prevent dissolution as long as any general
partner remains, 70 the partnership will dissolve on the death, retirement, insanity, or bankruptcy of the last general partner. 71 Under the regulations,

that possibility negates continuity of life.
There appear to be no means under the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act by which continuity in the life. of a limited partnership can be created
with the same certainty as is provided by the law of corporations. Arrangements can be made that so reduce the possibility of dissolution that a practical
equivalent of corporate continuity exists. The regulations, however, appear
to demand more. They state, without qualification, that "a limited partnership subject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act Racks] continuity of life." 72 The Tax Court has found that the emphasis
in the regulations on the legal concept of dissolution rather than the practical
possibility of termination of the business virtually requires that conclusion.- 3
The rules of the regulations relating to continuity of life do not refer
specifically to limited partnerships with corporations as their general partners.
A corporation presumably cannot experience two of the events which cause
dissolution of a limited partnership: death and insanity. However, a corporate
general partner may cause dissolution by its retirement, even though the
retirement breaches its obligations under the partnership agreement, or by
its bankruptcy.74 Under the rules of the regulations, the issue of continuity
appears to be unaffected by whether general partners are individual or
corporate.
CentralizedManagement

The regulations state: "An organization has centralized management if
68. See note 61 supra.
69. 66 T.C. at
70. Section 20 of the ULPA provides that the retirement, death or insanity of a
general partner will not cause dissolution of a limited partnership if "the business is
continued by the remaining general partners under a right to do so stated in the certificate."
71. ULPA §20. Dissolution would also result if the remaining general partners refused
to abide by their agreement to continue the business after the death, retirement or
insanity of any of them.
72. TrEAs. REG. §301.7701-2(b)(3).
73. Philip G. Larson, 66 T.G. No. 21 (Apr. 27,1976).
74. See notes 57 and 61 supra.
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any person (or group of persons which does not include all the members)
has continuing exclusive authority to make the management decisions necessary
to the conduct of the business for which the organization was formed."7 5
The board of directors of a corporation is vested with the exclusive power
to manage its business.76 No shareholder, acting as such, can represent it or
bind it by contract. A corporation has centralized management. Each partner
of a general partnership, in contrast, is an agent of the partnership with at
least apparent authority to carry on its business in the usual way.7 7 Although
partners may agree among themselves to restrict their mutual agency, the
restriction does not bind persons without knowledge of it. A general partner78
ship therefore lacks centralized management.
The power to manage the business of a limited partnership is vested
solely in its general partners.79 Limited partnerships have centralized management in a sense, but generally not in the sense intended by the regulations.
The directors of a corporation act as elected representatives of the shareholders. A director usually need not be a shareholder8 ° and even if he is his
authority is independent of his status as a shareholder. A general partner of
a limited partnership, on the other hand, is not a mere representative. He
is authorized to act for the partnership only because he is a partner and acts,
at least in part, on his own behalf as part owner of the business. The Board
of Tax Appeals concluded in Glensder Textile Co. that centralized management exists only when management functions are centralized in persons who,
like corporate directors, act as representatives of the owners and that the
sort of centralization that occurs in the operation of most limited partnerships is not analogous to corporate centralization. 8 ' The regulations reflect
that conclusion by providing that a limited partnership formed under the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act generally does not have centralized management.82
A general partner acts as an agent of the partnership. 83 Like all agents,
he must faithfully represent his principal 84 and cannot act solely to serve his
75. TREAS. REG. §301.7701-2(c)(1).
76. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §607.111(1) (1975).
77. UPA §9.
78. TREAs. REG. §301.7701-2(c)(4).
79. ULPA §§9, 10. A limited partner who "takes part in the control of the business"
is liable for partnership debts to the same extent as a general partner. Id. §7.

80. See, e.g.,

FLA. STAT.

§607.111(2) (1975).

81. Glensder Textile Co., 46 B.T.A. 176, 185 (1942), acquiesced in, 1942-1 Cum,. BULL. 8.
82. TREAs. REG. §301.7701-2(c)(4). Prior to the adoption of the cited regulation, the
Treasury proposed a regulation stating that all limited partnerships had centralization of
management. See Rustigan, Effect of Regulation Definitions on Real Estate Syndications,
N.Y.U. 19TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1065, 1071 (1961). Although the final regulation does
not explain the basis for the rule it adopts, the change evidently derived from an
acceptance of the rationale of Glensder Textile Co. that centralization of management in
the corporate sense exists only when managers act primarily as representatives.
83. Section 9 of the ULPA provides a general partner has the rights, powers and
liabilities of a partner in a general partnership. The UPA states a "partner is an
agent of the partnership for the purpose of its buiness." UPA §9(1).
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §13 (1957).
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own interests. The regulations are apparently premised on a belief that the

representative capacity of a general partner is usually subordinate. The
opposite is obviously true, however, when a general partner's interest in a
partnership is insubstantial. The regulations therefore provide that a limited
partnership will be regarded as having centralized management if "substantially all the interests in the partnership are owned by the limited
partners."8 5 This test leaves many questions unanswered. It is not stated,
for example, when the test is applied. Presumably the existence or lack of
centralized management is not determined for all time when a limited
partnership is formed. If substantially all interests are owned by limited
partners at any time, centralized management will probably be deemed

present for the period that situation persistsA86 Also, the meaning of the
phrase "substantially all" is explained only by examples indicating that more
than 90 percent is "substantially all."87 The Service will apparently rule there
is no centralization of management, however, when limited partners own

no more than 80 percent of all interests.85
The phrase "all the interests in the partnership" is also less than precise.
Partners may share profits and losses in proportions different from their
proportionate interests in partnership capital. General partners often receive
guaranteed payments, computed independently of partnership profits, as
compensation for their services. Profit and loss sharing arrangements and
capital accounts may change from year to year. How do such variables affect

the measurement of the substantiality of limited partner's interests?
Examples given in the regulations imply that only capital interests are

relevant.89 The Service will apparently rule that limited partners do not
own substantially all interests, however, when general partners have at least
TRmAs. REG. §301.7701-2(c)(4).
86. In Phillip G. Larson, 66 T.C. No. 21 (Apr. 27, 1976), the court indicated that
the relative values of the interests in the years at issue should he the controlling factor.
87. Centralization is found in two examples in the regulations in which limited partners
furnished capital of $5 million out of total capitalizations of $5,300,000 and $5,150,000,
respectively. TREAS. REG. §301.7701-3(b)(2), Exs. (1), (2).
88. See Points to Remember, 24 TAX LAWYER 605, 606 (1971); Kanter, supra note 88,
at 777. In applying the regulation rules relating to free transferability of interests, which
also turn in part on whether substantially all interests are held by limited partners, the
court in Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729, 742, 1975-2 U.S.T.C. 19778, at 88,439 n.14
(Ct. Cl. 1975) cited with approval Burnet v. Bank of Italy, 46 F.2d 629, 630 (9th Cir.
1931), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 846 (1931), which defined the phrase "substantially all" in
another context as "all except a negligible minority interest." The court also found persuasive
the use of 90% as a rule of thumb in applying the phrase "substantially all the properties"
in §368(a)(1)(C). Rev. Proc. 66-34, 1966-2 Cum. BULL. 1282. The rule of thumb is applied
there for ruling purposes only, however, and is not intended as a substantive rule defining
the lower limits of "substantially all." On the facts before it, the Zuckman court held
that limited partner ownership of 61% of all interests did not create centralization of
management.
89. The only examples illustrating the application of the regulation rules to limited
partnerships describe the capital contributions of the partners but make no reference to
the agreements for sharing profits and losses. Tlas. REc. §301.7701-3(b)(2), Exs. (1), (2).
The author of the examples may have intended, however, that it be assumed that profits
and losses were divided in proportion to capital contributions.

85.
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a 20 percent interest in either capital or profits. 90 A general partner's entitlement to management fees or other compensation for its services has not been
regarded as part of its partnership interest. 91
Phillip G. Larson92 was a case in which interests changed over time.
The two partnerships before the court were created under agreements
allocating all profits and all proceeds of the sale of partnership assets to the
limited partners until such allocations equalled their investments. Thereafter,
profits and sale proceeds were to be allocated 80 percent to the limited
partners and 20 percent to the general partner. 93 In essence, the general
partner had a 20 percent interest in the profits and capital of each partnership, subject to the limited partners' rights to recover their investments
first .

The court found the taxpayer had not shown the likelihood that any

substantial allocations would ever be made to the general partner and thus
held they had failed to sustain their burden of proving that substantially
all of the interests were not held by limited partners. The interests of the
general partner were also minimized, the court held, by the power granted
to the limited partners in each agreement to remove the general partner.
Although the court did not clearly state the standard it would apply when
such evidentiary problems were overcome, it suggested that the values of the
interests in the years at issue would be the determining factor.
Further complexities arise in applying the test of the regulation when
a person has an interest in a partnership as both a general and a limited
partner."5 Assume, for example, that an individual acting as sole general
partner of a limited partnership has a 30 percent interest as general partner
and a five percent interest as limited partner. The limited partners, in their
capacities as such, own only 70 percent of all interests, but viewing their
ownership in all capacities they own 100 percent of all interests. The former
percentage should probably be the one relevant to the centralization issue.
The general partner's ownership of a limited partnership interest increases
the extent to which he acts on his own behalf and hence reduces his representative role. In fact, the general partner in the example acts in a representative
capacity with respect to only 65 percent of the partnership interests and
that should perhaps be the percentage deemed relevant.
When there is a corporate general partner and limited partners are
shareholders of the corporation, the interests of limited partners could be
90. See Points to Remember, 24 TAx LAwYER 605, 606 (1971); Kanter, supra note 39,
at 777.
91. Technical Advice Memorandum of September 25, 1972, reproduced in BIERMAN,
LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 91, 96 (1974); Zarrow, Tax Shelters and the Public-New Uses for
Limited Partnerships and Joint Ventures, U. So. CAL. TAX INST. 277 (1970).
92. 66 T.C. No. 21 (Apr. 27, 1976).
93. Losses were allocated solely to limited partners at all times.
94. Another common factual variant raising the same problem is an arrangement
which allocates profits and losses to limited partners only for a stated period of time,
after which profits and losses are shared by all partners.
95. Section 12(1) of the ULPA states: "A person may be a general partner and a
limited partner in the same partnership at the same time." The status of a person
occupying such a dual role is described in §12(2) of the Act.
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calculated by taking into account their indirect interests in the partnership
as shareholders of the corporation. In Zuckman v. United States,96 for example,
a limited partner holding a 47 percent interest in a partnership was indirect
owner of all shares of the corporate general partner which held a 51 percent
interest. The government asserted that the general partnership interest should
be attributed to the limited partner and that all interests should therefore
be deemed held by limited partners. The court held that no attribution
rules were implicit in the regulations, but further stated that, assuming the
attribution could be made as suggested by the government, the ownership
of 98 percent of all interests by one person was by itself sufficient to warrant
a finding of no centralization. In view of the fact that a corporation wholly
owned by one person is a corporation for tax purposes, the latter holding
is of doubtful validity. The facts in Zuckman do show a practical equivalent
of centralized management in the sense that the board of directors of the
corporate general partner acted as representatives of a person owning 98
percent of all interests in the partnership. The representation so created is
much closer to corporate centralization than that occurring when an independent general partner has no substantial interest in a limited partnership.
However, the regulations, by focusing the issue solely on the extent of
limited partner interests, preclude a finding of centralization based on such a
practical equivalence.
The position of the government in Zuckman can be sustained under the
regulations, therefore, only by reading rules of attribution into them.
Historically, attributions between related parties, when intended, have not
been left to implication. 7 Furthermore, attribution concepts, if accepted in
principle in this area, quickly lead to a quagmire. Assume, for example, a
child is a limited partner of a partnership in which his parent is a general
partner. It has earlier been suggested that an individual general partner's
ownership of a limited partnership interest does not create corporate resemblance. Thus, any attribution from child to parent or vice versa in the
example assumed would likely lead to improper results if deemed relevant
to the association issue. If related party attributions are to be made in
some instances, but not in others, the courts may reasonably look to the
regulations for guidance before embarking on the first step.
Free Transferability of Interests
Unless bound by an agreement providing otherwise, a shareholder of a
corporation can freely dispose of his shares and any transferee succeeds to
all his rights. A corporation thus possesses the characteristic of free
transferability of interests. A transferee of an interest in a partnership,
on the other hand, does not become a partner unless the other partners
96. 545 F.2d 729 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
97. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§267(c), 318, 341(e)(8), 544, and 958 each set forth rules
for attributing ownership of corporate stock to related persons. The service has adopted
the attribution rules of §318 in determining the status of limited partnerships for rulings
purposes. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 Cum. BuLL. 735.
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consent.0 8 In the absence of that consent, the transferee takes the interest
of his transferor in the profits and capital of the venture, but is excluded
from all rights to participate in management and may require an accounting
99
for partnership transactions only upon dissolution. An organization has the
characteristic of free transferability only if each member may, without the
consent of the others, "confer upon his substitute all the attributes of his
interest in the organization."'1 00 Unless consent to substitute transferees as
partners is given by the partnership agreement, a partnership does not possess
the characteristic of free transferability of interests.
Since limited partners are always excluded from management, the failure
of a transferee to become a substituted partner is less significant when the
subject of a transfer is a limited partnership interest than when a general
partnership interest is transferred. However, a transferee of a limited partnership interest who does not become a substituted partner has no right to an
accounting or to information concerning partnership transactions.',, The
absence of such rights perhaps justifies the position of the regulations that
a limited partnership interest, like a general partnership interest, is freely
transferable only if the holder has the power to substitute another as
10 2
partner without the consent of his fellow partners.
The regulations provide that free transferability of limited partnership
interests is negated by conditioning the right of substitution upon the
consent of general partners only. 0 3 Limited partners need not have any say
in the matter. Although the regulations refer only to a case in which the
unanimous consent of all general partners is required, the same result would
presumably follow when a mere majority of the general partners can authorize
a substitution.
M
T
that limited partnership
The Tax Court held in Phillip G. Larson
interests in the partnerships at issue were freely transferable notwithstanding
a requirement of general partner consent to substitutions because the
98. UPA §27; ULPA §19.
99. Id.
100. TREAs. REG. §301.7701-2(e)(1).
101.

ULPA §19(3).

102. Some limited partnerships are structured to have only one limited partner who
sells fractional shares of his interest in profits, losses and capital to other investors. Since
the investors are not admitted as substituted limited partners, it is hoped that the partner-

ships will lack free transferability even though there are no restrictions on the transfer
of the fractional shares. Zariow, supra note 91, at 283. Although not denying that the

device precludes free transferability, the Service has thrown a damper over it by refusing
to rule on whether an assignee who is not a substituted partner will be treated as a
partner for income tax purposes. See Points to Remember, 28 TAx LAWYER 625-26 (1975).
Evans v. Commissioner, 447 F.2d 547, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. 9597 (7th Cir. 1971) held, however,
that an assignee of a partnership interest (which was a corporation wholly owned by the
assignor) became a partner for tax purposes even though it was not admitted as a substituted

partner. The consequence oilnot recognizing an assignee as a partner would be that
profits and losses would be allocated to the assignor for tax purposes even though he
has no economic interest in them. The absurdity of such a result speaks strongly against
any rule leading to it.
103.

TREAs. REG. §301.7701-3(b)(2), Ex. (1).

104. 66 T.C. No. 21 (Apr. 27, 1976).
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partnership agreements provided the general partner could not unreasonably
withhold its consent. Because a limited partner is a passive investor without
any voice in management, the welfare of a limited partnership will rarely
be affected by the identity of its limited partners and there will seldom be
a reasonable ground for withholding consent to a substitution. The Tax Court
thus found that a consent requirement does not impose a meaningful
restriction on transfer if consent may not be unreasonably withheld. Zuckman
v. United States0 5 held that a requirement of general partner consent did not
deny free transferability to a limited partnership interest held by a person
who controlled the general partner: "ifihe existence of a mere formal or
nominal condition will not prevent such member's interest from being freely
transferable within the meaning of the regulations."'106 The holdings in Larson
and Zuckman, although quite logical in themselves, tend to undermine the
rule stated in the regulations. When a partnership agreement does not provide
standards to be applied by a general partner in granting or denying his
consent to a substitution, for example, it is unlikely that a court would
construe the agreement to permit a general partner to withhold his consent
unreasonably.107 If a provision requiring that consent not be withheld unreasonably merely states what the law would imply in its absence, the presence
of the provision should not affect any tax result. A "formal or nominal
condition" seems to be enough to deny free transferability under the regulations.
If a partnership agreement entitles each partner to substitute another in
his place, but only after he has offered his interest to the other partners at
its fair market value, "a modified form of free transferability of interests
exists." 108 The rule, unfortunately, raises more questions than it answers.
It is not dear, for example, how a modified form of transferability affects
the ultimate conclusion on association status differently than an unmodified'
form of that characteristic. The regulations state that "the presence of this
modified corporate characteristic will be accorded less significance than if
such characteristic were present in an unmodified form."09 However, the
basic test of the regulations is that an entity is an association if it possesses
more of the relevant corporate characteristics than it lacks.110 In distinguishing
between partnerships and corporations, four characteristics are relevant. A
modified characteristic plus an unmodified characteristic or two unmodified
characteristics will not be enough. But, two unmodified characteristics plus
9778
(Ct. Cl. 1975).
105. 524 F.2d 729, 1975-2 U.S.T.C.
106. Id. at 743.
107. A general partner would probably be deemed to act as a partner, and not
individually, in granting or denying his consent. As a partner, a general partner acts
as an agent of the partnership and like all agents must act as a fiduciary in carrying out
his duties. A fiduciary must act reasonably in doing his work.
108. TaEAS. REo. §301.7701-2(e)(2). In Phillip G. Larson, 66 T.C. No. 21 (Apr. 27, 1976),
the Tax Court held that free transferability is present in unmodified form when a right
of first refusal is the only restraint on transfer and is exercisable only when a partner
proposes to dispose of his interest for less than fair market value.
109. TarAs. REG. §301.7701-2(e)(2).

110.

Id. §301.7701-2(a)(3).
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a modified one will apparently mandate association status just as three unmodified characteristics will. If that is so, there is seemingly no difference
in weight between a modified and an unmodified characteristic. If a modified
characteristic, when added to two unmodified characteristics, is not enough
to bring association status, then the presence of a modified characteristic is
irrelevant.
In referring only to a right of first refusal granted to other partners to
purchase at fair market value, the regulations leave uncertainty as to the
consequence of other restrictions which are similar in effect. Will a modified
form of free transferability exist, for example, if the only restriction on the
power of substitution is ihat a partner desiring to sell must first allow the
partnership to retire his interest for an amount equal to its fair market value?
A retirement of a partner's interest may entail tax consequences to him
different from those arising from a sale of his interest to another partner."'
However, a right of first refusal imposes essentially the same limitation on
transferability whether it is granted to the partnership or to the other partners.
The two types of restrictions should not have differing effects upon the
association issue.
The regulations refer only to a right of first refusal exercisable at a
purchase price equal to fair market value. Must the agreement use the
phrase "fair market value" or will the rule apply when the option price
is determined by a formula stated in the agreement? The effect of a formula
price should probably depend on whether the formula is reasonably calculated to yield a price equal to fair market value. If the price is book
value of the interest to be sold, for example, it will often be less than fair
market value. The prerequisite that an interest be offered at a depressed
price will restrict transferability quite significantly, since the making of a
transfer may result in a forfeiture. Unless the nature of partnership assets is
such that book value is a reasonable measure of market value, provisions for
a right of first refusal to purchase at book value should therefore be deemed
to negate free transferability of interests. A formula price based upon
partnership earnings or the fair market value of partnership assets may
represent a realistic measure of fair market value, and a right to purchase
at a price so determined should be viewed as a right to purchase at fair
market value.
What effect will be given to an agreement granting the remaining
partners or the partnership an option to purchase or retire a partner's interest
when he dies? Perhaps such an option should be viewed as not affecting
the transferability issue since it can only force a transfer and can never
block one. The option may make a sale by a living partner more difficult,
particularly if the option price may not equal fair market value, because
prospective purchasers may be unwilling to buy the interest subject to the
option. Even viewed from that perspective, however, the option may be
seen as only depressing the value of the interest and as not limiting the right
of substitution, since the act of transfer would never cause a forfeiture. Such
an option, in sum, should not be relied upon as negating free transferability.
111.

INT. REv. CODE OF 1954

§§736, 741.
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The regulations state an organization possesses the characteristic of free
transferability of interests only if the power of substitution is granted to "each
of its members or those members owning substantially all of the interests
in the organization." 112 A limited partnership agreement allowing limited
partners to substitute freely, but denying the right of substitution to general
partners, will not have the characteristic unless the limited partnership
interests constitute substantially all of the interests in the partnership. Because
a grant of the right of substitution to general partners allows management
responsibilities to be passed from hand to hand without the consent of limited
partners, few partnership agreements grant that right to general partners.
Limited Liability
The regulations provide that an entity possesses the corporate characteristic of limited liability if it is governed by local laws that relieve all its
members of personal liability for debts of the organization."13 Limited
partners are usually not personally liable for claims against the partnership,'- but general partners enjoy no limitation of liability."15 Since the
regulations state that the corporate characteristic of limited liability is present
only when no member of an organization has personal liability for its debts,
limited partnerships organized under statutes patterned after the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act generally do not have the characteristic. 1 6
A general partner is not deemed personally liable for partnership debts,
however, "when he has no substantial assets (other than his interest in the
partnership) which could be reached by a creditor of the organization and
when he is merely a 'dummy' acting as the agent of the limited partners."" 7
The test and much of the language used to express it are taken from the
opinion of the Board of Tax Appeals in Glensder Textile Co."5s The regulations, however, give it a role of less importance than that contemplated by
the court. The opinion in Glensder Textile Co. states that "there would be
something approaching the corporate form of stockholders and directors""1l
whenever all general partners are dummies without substantial assets, which
suggests that such circumstances might alone be justification for classifying a
limited partnership as an association. The regulations, in contrast, make the
test relevant only to the issue of limited liability.
The reference in the regulations to "substantial assets" might, under the
circumstances, suggest a relative test. A general partner having assets valued
112. TRE.As. MEG. §301.7701-2(e)(1).
113. Id. §301.7701-2(d)(1).
114. A limited partner's insulation from personal liability is lost only if he "takes
part in the control of the business." ULPA §7.
115. ULPA §9(1); UPA §15.
116. TREAs. REG. §301.7701-2(d)(1).
117. Id. §301.7701-2(d)(2).
118. 46 B.T.A. 176, 183 (1942), acquiesced in, 1942-1 CuM. BULL. 8. The opinion speaks
of a hypothetical limited partnership whose "general partners were not men with substantial
assets risked in the business, but were mere dummies without real means acting as agents
of the limited partners, whose investments made possible the business." 46 B.TA. at 183.

119. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1976

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

at $10,000, for example, could be regarded as having substantial assets if
total liabilities of his partnership are $50,000 or $100,000, but not if they
are $5 million or 10 million. However, the regulations indicate the test is
an absolute one. They state:
[I]f the organization is engaged in financial transactions which involve
large sums of money, and if the general partners have substantial
assets (other than their interests in the partnership), there exists personal
liability although the assets of such general partners would be insufficient
to satisfy any substantial portion of the obligations of the organization.120

Since a meaningful ability to respond to partnership obligations is not required, there is no basis for defining "substantial assets" by reference to the
magnitude of the liabilities of a partnership.1 2' Without that reference, however, it is very difficult to quantify the meaning of the phrase. The regulations simply leave the issue to baseless speculation.
The "substantial assets" test is applied, of course, by looking to a general
partner's assets, not his net worth. A general partner who is hopelessly insolvent may have substantial assets. However, the issue as stated by the
regulations is whether a general partner has "substantial assets . . . which
could be reached by a creditor of the organization ...." 22Assets encumbered
by liens securing individual liabilities of a general partner are therefore
taken into account only to the extent of the partner's equity in them. 23
120. TREAS. REG. §301.7701-2(d)(2).
121. One author has noted, however, that the Service, in audit examinations of his
clients, has measured the substantiality of the assets of general partners by computing
ratios comparing general partner assets with limited partnership liabilities. Sexton, The
Shrinking Tax Shelter Umbrella, 52 TAxEs 715, 726-27 (1974). Such an approach could
perhaps be reconciled with the regulations if the ratio required to show "substantial
assets" was quite small. For example, assets valued at 10 or 15% of partnership liabilities
might be seen as "insufficient to satisfy any substantial portion of the obligations of the
organization." TREAS. REG. §301.7701-2(d)(2). When partnership liabilities are not large,
however, a ratio test of 10 or 15% could characterize assets worth only a few hundreds
of dollars as substantial.
When measuring substantiality using ratios of general partner assets to partnership
liabilities, the Service will apparently treat as liabilities so-called nonrecourse debt on
which no partner, general or limited, has personal liability. Such debts are always secured
by partnership assets, and a partnership must pay them when due to retain the benefits
of its assets. The Service therefore does not regard the lack of personal liability as a
sufficient ground for ignoring them. See Sexton, supra, at 726-27. A nonrecourse debt,
however, is in no sense a charge against the assets of general partners. The relationship
between general partner assets and nonrecourse debt is quite clearly relevant to nothing.
The presence of nonrecourse debt creates a form of limited liability. However, the regulations, by their focus on the assets and roles of general partners, exclude from consideration
any limitation on liability which does not derive from the status of general partners
personally.
122. TREAS.REG. §301.7701-2(d)(2).
123. If a general partner grants a security interest in his individual assets to secure
partnership liabilities, however, the encumbrance should be ignored for this purpose since
the full value of the assets, except to the extent burdened by prior encumbrances, may
be "reached by a creditor of the organization." Id.
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Furthermore, a general partner's interest in the partnership is excluded in
1 24
determining the substantiality of his assets.
The test for determining whether a general partner is personally liable
is phrased in the conjunctive. A general partner without substantial assets
lacks personal liability only if it is also shown that "he is merely a 'dummy'
acting as agent of the limited partners."' 125 The word "dummy" is not defined,
but it probably adds little to the meaning of the quoted phrase. Presumably the
intelligence of the general partner is not an issue. The dictionary definition
of "dummy" evidently intended is "one . . . that although seeming to act
for himself is in reality acting for another .... ,'26A dummy is an agent acting
for an undisclosed principal.
A casual reading of the regulations leaves the impression that a limited
partnership has the characteristic of limited liability if all its general
partners are dummies with no substantial assets. However, the regulations
further state: "when the limited partners act as the principals of such
general partner, personal liability will exist with respect to such limited
partners.' 127 The rule derives from state law, not the tax statutes. The Uniform
Limited Partnership Act denies the privilege of limited liability to a limited
partner who "takes part in the control of the business."' 28 Although the issue
has not been ruled on under the Act, it seems reasonable to conclude, as the
writer of the regulations apparently did, that a limited partner who designates
an agent to act as general partner is participating in the control of the
business through the agent and thus loses his insulation from personal
124. Id. The regulations do not define the phrase "interest in the partnership." Presumably it refers only to interests held as a partner and does not include the value of a
general partner's claims as a creditor of his partnership.
125. Id. The government argued in Phillip G. Larson, 66 T.C. No. 21 (Apr. 27, 1976),
that the test should be read disjunctively. The plain meaning of the words used in
the regulations is to the contrary and the court dismissed the government's contention.
Prior to the adoption of the present regulations, the Treasury proposed regulations
making the issue of a general partner's personal liability turn only on the extent of
his assets. The reference to dummies was added to the final regulations in response to
taxpayer protests that Glensder Textile Co. had established that a general partner should
never be found to lack personal liability unless he acts "as the agent for the persons
who supplied the capital." Rustigan, Effect of Regulation Definitions on Real Estate
Syndicates, N.Y.U. 19rH INST. ON FED. TAx: 1065, 1073-74 (1961).
The Tax Court indicated in Phillip G. Larson, that the Treasury may have been
overly generous in yielding to such complaints. The court quoted from the sentence in
Glensder Textile Co. stating that corporate resemblance would exist "if, for instance,
the general partners were not men with substantial assets, but were mere dummies ...
"
66 T.C. at
. Glensder Textile Co., quoting, 46 B.TA. 176, 183 (1942), acquiesced in,
1942-1 Cum. BULL. 8. This sentence, the Larson court believed, made a general partner's
status as a dummy a consequence of his lack of substantial assets, not an independent
criterion. The regulations, by substituting "and" for "but," changed the import of the
sentence, according to the court, and gave the word "dummy" a meaning not related to
the quantity of assets held by general partners. The history of the regulations, as well
as the language used, fully supports that conclusion.
126. WarEBR's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED

701 (1959).

127. TREAS. RFa. §301.7701-2(d)(2).
128. ULPA §7.
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liability; or, perhaps the statement in the regulations is based on the liability of
a principal for obligations incurred by his agent while acting within the
129
scope of the agency.
The effect of the rule, wherever its base may lie, is seemingly to preclude
a limited partnership from possessing the corporate characteristic of limited
liability. When all general partners act as agents of limited partners, as they
apparently must to be deemed lacking in personal liability under the
regulations, the limited partners are principals and have personal liability.
In any limited partnership, therefore, either general partners or limited
partners are deemed personally liable for partnership debts. The corporate
characteristic of limited liability exists, according to the regulations, only
when no member of an organization has personal liability. The inevitable
130
conclusion, which the Court of Claims reached in Zuckman v. United States,
is that a limited partnership may not have the corporate characteristic of
limited liability.
Several lines of argument may be advanced in opposition to the
categorical position of the Court of Claims. The government argued in Zuckman that limited partners become personally liable for partnership debts only
when they are held out to third parties as being so liable. 131 When general
partners are dummies without substantial assets, but limited partners are
not held out as general partners, the government contended, no partner
has personal liability. The argument is difficult to square with the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act which makes no reference to public representations
in its rule imposing personal liability upon limited partners participating
in the control of a limited partnership. 32 The argument also ignores the
rules of agency law making undisclosed principals liable for obligations incurred by their agents while acting within the scope of the agency. 33 The
court rejected the argument.
Judge Simpson, in his dissent in Phillip G. Larson,'3 4 attempted to avoid
the dilemma by refining the meaning of the word "dummy." The regulations
take the word from the opinion of the Board of Tax Appeals in Glensder
129.

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF

AGENCY

§140

(1957).

130. 524 F.2d 729, 741-42 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
131. The argument, as summarized by the court, was that a limited partner is personally
liable when it is shown that he participated in control and "in addition, that his words
or actions have actually and reasonably led third parties to believe that he was generally
liable, and to act on that belief." Id. at 740. The government argued that a limited partner
of the partnership before the court, who was alleged to have exerted management control,
did not have personal liability, because he "at all times was held out as only a limited
partner." Id.
132. ULPA §7. A limited partner who holds himself out as a person responsible for
partnership debts may be estopped from denying his liability, even though he does
not participate in management. E. LAIrY & G. FRAMPTON, BAsIc BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS,
596-97 (1963). Section 7 of the ULPA has not, however, been construed to be premised on
estoppel. Walker, Partnership: Can Rights Required to be Given Limited Partners Under

the New Tax Shelter Regulations be Reconciled with Section 7 of the Uniform Partnership Act, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 289, 293 (1973).
133.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §186

(1957).

134. 66 T.C. No. 21 (Apr. 27, 1976).
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Textile Co.' 35 The Glensder court, according to Judge Simpson, did not
intend the word to refer only to strawmen or agents in a common law sense,
but meant to include any arrangement allowing limited partners the sort
of control over general partners that shareholders of a corporation have over
directors. 36 A significant characteristic of the relationship between shareholders and directors is the power of shareholders to vote directors out. Judge
Simpson would therefore have found the general partner of the partnerships
before the court to be a dummy because the limited partners in each case
had the power to remove it. The general partner was admitted by all to be
without substantial assets, and the power of the limited partners to remove
the general partner was not seen as making limited partners personally liable.
Judge Simpson would therefore have held no partner was personally liable
for the debts of the partnerships at issue. The argument is not readily
reconciled with the language of either the regulations or the Glensder opinion
which both follow the reference to dummies with the phrase "acting as agents
of the limited partners."' 3 7 There is no indication in either source that the
word "agents" is used in a figurative sense. Furthermore, a power of limited
partners to indirectly control a general partner does not affect, legally or
practically, the extent of the general partner's responsibility for partnership
debts. When a general partner is a common law agent for limited partners,
he has a right to be indemnified against liabilities incurred for the benefit
of his principals. 38 A relationship between general and limited partners that
has some of the characteristics of an agency, but which does not create that
right, does not bear upon whether the general partner has personal liability
and should not be considered in defining the word dummy.
The regulations contain an enigmatic reference to corporations acting
as general partners which may be read to say that a corporate general partner
can lack personal liability even though it is not a dummy. The regulations
state: "If a corporation is a general partner, personal liability exists with
respect to such general partner when the corporation has substantial assets
which could be reached by creditors of the limited partnership."' 39 The
sentence curiously omits any mention of the dummy criterion. The other
sentences of the paragraph use the unqualified phrase "general partner" in
135. 46 B.T.A. 176, 183 (1942), acquiesced in, 1942-I Cum. BULL. 8.
136. The Service may define the word "dummy" even more broadly than Judge Simpson. One author has reported that the Service, in auditing certain of his clients, has
treated general partners as dummies when they have no capital at risk in their partnerships,
receive compensation for their services in amounts determined independently of partnership income, and do not share in partnership profits and losses. Sexton, supra, note 121 at
726-27. The financial participation of such a general partner is similar to a typical
financial arrangement between agent and principal. It does not, however, make the general

partner a common law agent of any limited partner or allow limited partners to control
the actions of the general partner. It has no apparent relevance to the issue of a general
partner's personal liability and thus should not be considered in applying the word
"dummy" in the regulation provision dealing with personal liability. See text accompanying

note 138 infra.
137. In the Regulations the word "agent" is singular.
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §438(2)(a) (1957).
139. TRaAs.

REG.

§301.7701-2(d)(2).
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stating the dual test for determining whether a general partner has limited
liability and give no indication that the rules are different for individual
and corporate general partners. However, the isolated reference to corporate
general partners implies that they may be deemed lacking in personal liability
even when they are not dummies.140 Furthermore, corporate general partners
can reasonably be distinguished from individuals acting in that role. An
individual general partner who is not an agent and hence has no right to be
indemnified against his undertakings as general partner, can escape the burden
of partnership debts only by declaring bankruptcy. Even though he presently
has no substantial assets, partnership obligations can be satisfied from his
future earnings and assets. The personal liability devolving upon an individual
general partner is rarely a trifling matter. A corporate general partner with
no substantial assets, on the other hand, can simply be abandoned by its
shareholders if the partnership business turns sour and partnership creditors
will then have no recourse against any substantial assets or earnings, present
or future, outside the partnership. When a corporate general partner has no
substantial assets, in sum, its legal liability for partnership debts is not a
meaningful burden. Therefore, the Treasury could reasonably ignore the
legal liability in such a case and base a finding of limited liability solely
upon a corporate general partner's lack of substantial assets. The regulations
14

arguably so provide.

1

Other Factors
The regulations provide that factors other than the four characteristics
primarily stressed may be of importance in some cases in distinguishing
partnerships from associations.142 They do not describe any such factors, however, and the reference was probably intended only to allow flexibility in
resolving cases not anticipated by the authors of the regulations. Morrissey
v. Commissioner143 established that corporate resemblance is the touchstone
of the association concept. A factor not mentioned in the regulations is relevant
to the issue, therefore, only if it tends to show or negate corporate resemblance.
To be relevant over and above the four primary characteristics, furthermore,
a factor should not be related to any of the primary characteristics. For
example, Judge Simpson, dissenting in Phillip G. Larson,-" pointed to pro140. Admittedly, the implication is not a strong one. The statement made, that a
corporate general partner with substantial assets is deemed to have personal liability, is
fully consistent with the dual test expressed in the remainder of the regulation. However,
if the "substantial assets" and "dummy" tests both apply to corporate general partners,
the rules applied to corporate and individual general partners are identical and the
reference to corporate general partner partners is wholly redundant.
141. The argument made here is inconsistent with Zuckman v. United States, 524
F.2d (Ct. Cl. 1975) and Phillip G. Larson, 66 T.C. No. 21 (Apr. 27, 1976), both of which
held corporate general partners without substantial assets to have personal liability because
they were not dummies. The argument was not advanced by the government in either case,
however.
142. TREAs. REG. §301.7701-2(a)(1).

143. 296 U.S. 344 1936-1 U.S.T.C. %9020 (1936).
144. 66 T.C. No. 21 (Apr. 27, 1976).
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visions allowing limited partners to remove a general partner as a salient
additional factor. Judge Dawson, concurring in the same case, 145 disagreed,
saying that the only relevance of the removal power was in resolving the
issue of centralization of management. 46 As the regulations are presently
structured, the latter is the better view. If the power were taken to create
a separate corporate attribute, factors bearing on centralization would create
two characteristics and the mechanical rules of the regulations would be un47
fairly biased toward association status.
REVENUE PROCEDURE

72-13

s

Revenue Procedure 72-13-8 was issued in 1972 to provide guidance to
taxpayers seeking advance rulings regarding the tax status of limited partnerships whose only general partners are corporations. Four conditions are
stated. They relate to limited partner ownership of the stock of the general
partner, 49 the net worth of the general partner, 50 sales of limited partnership interests in conjunction with securities of the general partner,' 5' and
compliance with state laws governing limited partnerships.'5 2 A limited
partnership having a corporation as its sole general partner will be ruled a
partnership for tax purposes only if all of the conditions are satisfied.
Limited PartnerOwnership of Stock of GeneralPartner
Revenue Procedure 72-13 states that a ruling on the status of a limited
partnership whose only general partner is a corporation will not issue unless
"[t]he limited partners will not own, directly or indirectly, individually or
145. Id.
146. A power of limited partners to remove a general partner resembles the power
of shareholders to vote directors out. The power of shareholders to elect and remove
directors is part of the battery of rules making directors representatives of shareholders
and giving corporations the representative form of centralization described in the regulations.
147. An organization is deemed an association only when it possesses more than onehalf of the relevant corporate characteristics. TREAS. REG. §301.7701-2(a)(3). Any fraction is,
of course, increased by adding one to both its numerator and denominator. A partnership
possessing two of the four primary characteristics will be classed as an association, for
example, if it is found to also possess a fifth relevant characteristic.
Judge Dawson's concurring opinion in Philip G. Larson, 66 T.C. No. 21, (Apr. 27, 1976),
points to another problem in adding "other factors" to the mechanical procedure prescribed by the- regulations. If the presence of -some "other factor" is to be taken into
account in determining whether an organization has more than one-half of the relevant
corporate characteristics, it would seem that the absence of the factor should also be
weighed in the formula. If that is so, it cannot be said that any organization has more
than one-half of the relevant characteristics until all possible "other factors" are identified
and counted. Since the reference to "other factors" is intended as a device to catch unanticipated cases, they are, by definition, not capable of being catalogued.
148. 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 735.
149. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 735.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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in the aggregate, more than 20 percent of the stock of the corporate general
partner." 153
The regulations contain no suggestion that limited partner ownership of
stock of a general partner may be relevant to the association issue. The imposition of a single requirement which must be met, furthermore, seems to
conflict with the general rule of the regulations that an entity is classified
as an association only if it possesses more of the relevant corporate characteristics than it lacks.'- The ownership condition is apparently deemed justified
by the statement in the regulations that factors other than those described
there "may be found in some cases which may be significant in classifying an
organization."' 155 Other factors should be relevant, however, only if they
bear upon the touchstone of the association concept, corporate resemblance.16
Can a limited partnership reasonably be seen as resembling a corporation
more than a partnership merely because its limited partners own stock of
its corporate general partner? A plausible argument can be made that
limited partner ownership of stock of a sole corporate general partner can
in some situations give a limited partnership practical equivalents of three
of the four corporate characteristics given primary emphasis in the regulations:
continuity of life, centralized management, and limited liability.
Continuity of life is deemed to exist, for example, "if the death, insanity,
bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member will not
cause a dissolution of the organization."'' 57 When the sole general partner
of a limited partnership is a corporation, the entity can usually be prematurely dissolved only by the retirement or bankruptcy of the general
partner. 5s If a corporate general partner is controlled by limited partners,
they will determine, directly or through the directors they elect, whether
and when the general partner retires. A decision that the general partner
should retire and thereby cause dissolution of the partnership therefore resembles the decision of shareholders that a corporation should be dissolved.
The possibility of dissolution by the bankruptcy of a general partner does
not fit as readily within the corporate model. However, when limited partners
control a corporate general partner, their elected representatives determine
the course of action which may lead the corporation to bankruptcy. A limited
partnership must be declared a bankrupt when its sole general partner enters
bankruptcy. 159 The bankruptcy of a sole corporate general partner controlled
by limited partners therefore bears a certain resemblance in its effect on
entity continuity to the bankruptcy of a venture conducted wholly in corporate
153. Id. This rule also forbids limited partner ownership of more than 20 percent
of the stock of any corporation in an affiliated group (as defined in Int. Rev. Code of
1954, §1504(a)) that includes the corporate general partner. The stock ownership of any
limited partner is determined by applying the attribution rules of INT. REV. CODE OF
1951, §318.

154.

TREAS. REG.

§301.7701-2(a)(3).

155. Id. §301.7701-(2)(1).
156. See text accompanying notes 142-147 supra.
157. TREAS. REG. §301.7701-2(b)(1).
158. See text accompanying notes 57, 61 and 74 supra.
159. 11 U.S.C. §23(i) (1970).
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form. A limited partnership whose only general partner is a corporation controlled by limited partners can thus be seen as possessing a practical equivalent
of continuity of life.
Limited partner control of a corporate general partner can also be viewed
as creating centralization of management. A limited partnership is managed
by its general partners.16 0 When a corporation is the only general partner
of a limited partnership, its board of directors, which has the power to manage
all corporate business,' 6' is ultimately responsible for its actions as general
partner. If the limited partners can elect a majority of the directors of the
general partner, the business of the partnership is managed by representatives
of the limited partners and centralization of management in the representa62
tive sense intended by the regulations exists.
When the ownership of limited partnership interests parallels ownership
of the stock of a sole general partner, a practical equivalent of limited liability
also exists. When the same persons hold all limited partnership interests and
all shares of the corporate general partner in the same proportions, for example,
the partnership and corporation can realistically be seen as a single venture
owned 'by a group of persons none of whom is personally liable for its
obligations. The fact that corporate assets can be looked to for satisfaction
of partnership debts is, in such a case, little different from the exposure
of one division of a corporate enterprise to liabilities arising in the conduct
of other divisions. When the ownership of limited partnership interests and
shares of a general partner overlap but complete identity is lacking, the
corporate analogy is less clear, but a practical equivalent of limited liability
may still exist.
A substantial overlap in the ownership of limited partnership interests
and shares of a sole corporate general partner, when sufficient to give limited
partners practical control of the general partner, can therefore create
equivalents of three of the four relevant corporate characteristics. Of course,
limited partner ownership of 20 percent of the stock of a corporate general
partner, the guidepost established by Revenue Procedure 72-13, is not enough
to constitute practical control in all cases. The Procedure, however, is intended only to specify cases in which the Service will not rule. The 20
percent rule is evidently only a rule of thumb imposed to weed out cases
presenting issues of fact not appropriate for resolution in advance rulings.
The arguments advanced above, although drawn from certain of the
rules of the regulations, are not consistent with the regulations as a whole.
For example, the regulations state without qualification that "a limited
partnership subject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act Packs] continuity of life.' 1 3 The Act allows corporations to act as
general partners of limited partnerships" and does not forbid limited
partners from owning stock of such a general partner. The regulations state
160. ULPA §9; UPA §9(1).
161. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §607.111(1) (1975).
162. See text accompanying notes 79-82 supra.
163.

TREAs.REG. §301.7701-2(b)(3).

164. See note 24 supra.
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with equal clarity that a general partner with substantial assets will be
deemed personally liable for partnership debts. 165 The ownership test of
Revenue Procedure 72-13 makes no reference to the quantity of assets held
by a corporate general partner. Although the regulations are less categorical
in describing the centralized management characteristic, 166 they do plainly
state that possession of one of the relevant characteristics will not make an
entity an association.167 Any rule based solely on ownership of stock of a
general partner can be reconciled with the regulations only by pointing to
their unexplained reference to "other factors. ' '1 6 Because limited partner
ownership of such stock relates to three of the primary characteristics, but
in ways generally excluded from consideration by the regulations, the
appropriateness of an ownership test based on "other factors" is doubtful. 69
The ownership condition of Revenue Procedure 72-13 may also be
criticized for its lack of precision. When it refers, for example, to limited
partner ownership of "more than 20 percent of the stock of the corporate
general partner,""70 is it intended that stock be taken into account whether
it is common or preferred, voting or nonvoting? The Procedure suggests that
all shareholdings are considered. However, if limited partner shareholdings
are relevant only when they insure limited partner control of the corporate
general partner, the test should turn only on ownership of voting shares.
Whenever two or more classes of stock are taken into account there will
be obvious difficulties in determining whether the shares held by limited
partners constitute more than 20 percent of the outstanding stock. If only
voting shares are considered, the test should be whether the limited partners
hold shares representing more than 20 percent of the voting power of all
shareholders. If nonvoting shares are also taken into account, the test can
be applied reasonably only by reference to the value of the shares outstanding. But the Service will not ordinarily rule on issues turning principally on
the value of property. 71 When common and preferred stock is outstanding,
furthermore, the relative values of the two types of shares fluctuate constantly
and the Service would usually be reluctant to issue an advance ruling when
the relevant facts are ever changing. The difficulties encountered in applying
an ownership test for rulings purposes to nonvoting stock furnish additional
support for the conclusion that only voting stock should be counted.
The Procedure addresses only the case in which a corporation is the sole
general partner of a limited partnership. Will the stock ownership condition
165. TREAs. REG. §301.7701-2(d)(2).
166. The regulations state that "limited partnerships subject to a statute corresponding
to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act generally do not have centralized management"
except when substantially all interests are held by limited partners. Id. §301.7701-2(c)(4)
(emphasis added). The word "generally" allows some flexibility in the application of the
quoted language, but no factor other than the substantiality of general partnership
interests is identified in the regulations as being relevant to the issue.
167. Id. §301.7701-2(a)(3).
168. Id. §301.7701-2(a)(1).
169. See text accompanying notes 144-147 supra.
170. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 CUM. BULL. 735.
171. Rev. Proc. 72-9, 1972-1 CUM. BULL. 721.
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also be applied when a limited partnership has two or more corporate
general partners? The policy underlying the condition, whatever it might
be, probably precludes a favorable ruling when limited partners own more
than 20 percent of the stock of each general partner. A favorable ruling could
be issued consistently with the Procedure, however, when limited partners
own more than 20 percent of the shares of one corporate general partner,
but less than 20 percent of another. If any corporate general partner is not
controlled by limited partners, persons independent of the limited partners
can cause dissolution of the partnership by deciding that the general partner
should retire. Limited partner control of another corporate general partner
would not, in such a case, create a practical equivalent of continuity of life.
Since all general partners are agents with at least apparent authority to
carry on partnership business in the usual way, 7 2 control of one corporate
general partner by limited partners does not create an equivalent of centralization of management if another corporate general partner is not so controlled.
The appearance of limited liability is also weakened when any corporate
general partner is owned independently of the limited partners.
Correspondingly, neither the 20 percent condition nor any analogue to it
should apply when an individual serves as general partner, either alone or
with a corporate general partner. Superficially, it may seem that an individual
general partner who is an agent of limited partners resembles a corporate
general partner controlled by limited partners. However, an individual general
partner's status as an agent of limited partners will not prevent his death
from causing dissolution of the partnership contrary to the wishes of his
principals 17 And the regulations properly point out that such an agency
reduces liability limitations by making limited partners personally liable.:,The only corporate characteristic created by the agency is a form of centralized
management 175 and it should not be sufficient, standing alone, to preclude
issuance of a ruling on the association issue. Also, the 20 percent rule should
not apply when an individual serves as general partner along with a corporation controlled by limited partners. The presence of an individual general
partner effectively dispels the equivalence of continuity of life, centralization
of management, and limited liability which otherwise could be created by
limited partnership ownership of stock of the general partner.
The Service has also not spoken on the role of the policies underlying the
20 percent condition in the government's position in audits and litigated
cases. If the policy relates largely to limited partner control of corporate

general partners, as is here suggested, the 20 percent figure cannot reasonably
be advanced as an unyielding benchmark. Ownership of significantly less than
172. ULPA §9; UPA §9(1).
173. ULPA §20. An organization which may be dissolved by the death of any of its
members lacks the corporate characteristic of continuity of life. TREAs. REG. §301.7701-2(b)(1).
174. TREAS. REG. §301.7701-2(d)(2). See text accompanying notes 127-129 supra.
175. Although the regulations state that a limited partnership generally has centralized
management only when substantially all interests in it are held by limited partners, TPXAS.
R G. §301.7701-2(c)(4), an agency relationship between limited and general partners creates
a representative form of management so close to the corporate model that it could hardly
be ignored even though not mentioned in the regulations.
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50 percent of the voting shares of a corporation usually carries practical
control only when the holders of the shares in question are closely associated
and the remaining shares are dispersed. The issue of control must, in sum,
be resolved case by case.
The breadth of limited partner ownership of a general partner's stock
should also be relevant. Corporate resemblance is most striking when the
stock and the limited partnership interests are held by the same persons
in the same proportions."1 In Phillip G. Larson,17 7 at the other pole, a limited
partner having less than a two percent interest in one of the partnerships
there involved also owned more than 20 percent of the stock of its general
partner. There was no other cross ownership. In such a case, most limited
partners have no voice in the general partner's management of the partnership and a decision of the general partner to retire, for example, cannot
reasonably be said to be a decision of the limited partners. Analogies to the
corporate characteristics of continuity of life and centralization of management are also quite weak. The cross ownership of stock and limited partnership interests should be given little weight in such situations. The government did not raise the issue in Larson.
Net Worth of the Corporate General Partner
A limited partnership having a corporation as its sole general partner
will be ruled a partnership for tax purposes only if the net worth of the
general partner will at all times equal or exceed a floor prescribed by the
following rules: If the total of all contributions to a limited partnership is
less than $2.5 million, the net worth of its corporate general partner must
be at least $250,000 or 15 percent of the contributions, whichever is less.
When partnership contributions are $2.5 million or more in the aggregate,
the net worth floor is 10 percent of the contributions. 1178 If a corporation serves
as general partner of more than one limited partnership, a floor is separately
computed for each limited partnership and the net worth of the corporation
must not be less than the sum of the amounts so determined.Y9 The net
worth of a general partner is computed using the fair market value of its
assets,180 but its interest in all limited partnerships of which it is general
partner and all accounts and notes receivable from such partnerships are not
counted as assets for this purpose. 8 1 Liabilities owing to the partnerships are
2

also excluded from consideration.18
176.

Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729, 1975-2 U.S.T.C. %9778 (1975), almost fits

the factual model described in text. The corporate general partner there was indirectly
owned by a person who held about 96 percent of all the limited partnership interests.
The government did not contend in Zuckman, however, that limited partner ownership of
the corporate general partner was, by itself, sufficient to categorize the limited partnership

as an association.
177. 66 T.C. No. 21 (Apr. 27, 1976).
178.

Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 735.

179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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The net worth tests of the Procedure could be viewed as a statement of
the rulings position of the Service in applying the regulation provisions
relating to limited liability. 18 3 It has previously been suggested that the
regulations can be read to say that a corporate general partner lacks personal
liability when it has no substantial assets. 84 However, limited liability is
only one of four factors stressed by the regulations in distinguishing between
partnerships and corporationsis 5 and the regulations state that an entity is
to be deemed an association only if it has more corporate characteristics
than it lacks.' 86 The net worth tests of the Procedure must always be satisfied
even though a partnership has no other corporate attributes. Furthermore,
the regulation rules relating to limited liability look to the extent of a
general partner's assets, not its net worth. 8 7 The net worth tests, in sum, are
not easily reconciled with the regulations.
The tests can be justified, however, by viewing the issues somewhat more
broadly than they are in the regulations. If a corporate general partner's
only asset is its interest in a limited partnership, for example, the shares
of the general partner represent no more than indirect interests in the
partnership. When such a partner has assets apart from its partnership interest, but its independent net worth is insignificant in comparison to the
value of that interest, the shares are primarily indirect interests in the
partnership. Whenever the ownership of shares in a sole corporate general
partner is principally an indirect investment in a limited partnership, the
shares and the limited partnership interests are essentially two classes of
ownership interests in the partnership business and resemble voting and
nonvoting shares of a corporation. That resemblance gives the limited partnership practical equivalents of at least three of the four corporate characteristics
described in the regulations as most important.
For example, the possibility of dissolution by reason of the retirement
or bankruptcy of the general partner 88 does not negate continuity of life
in such a case. A decision that the general partner should retire will be
made by the shareholders of the general partner or the directors of the
corporation as their representatives. Because the shares are principally indirect
interests in the partnership, any such decision resembles a shareholder vote
for corporate dissolution. If the general partner has few activities apart from
the partnership its bankruptcy will usually result only from bankruptcy of
the partnership. Even if the partnership remains solvent, the general partner's
bankruptcy will result in the partnership being declared a bankrupt. 89 A
dissolution resulting from the bankruptcy of such a general partner -is not

TREAs. REG. §301.7701-2(d)(2).
184. See text accompanying notes 139-141 supra.
183.

185.

TREAS. REG. §301.7701-2(a)(2).

186. Id. §301.7701-2(d)(2).
187. Id.
188. Generally, premature dissolution will result only from the bankruptcy or retirement of a general partner when a limited partnership has a corporation as its only
general partner. See text accompanying notes 57, 61 and 74 supra.
189. 11 U.S.C. §23(1) (1970).
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materially different in practical effect from the bankruptcy of a venture conducted wholly in corporate form.
Centralization of management in the representative sense intended by the
regulations 19 also exists, because the board of directors of the general partner
manage the business of the partnership as representatives of shareholders
whose beneficial interests are primarily interests in the partnership. Also,
when limited partners and shareholders of the general partners are viewed
as joint owners of a consolidated enterprise comprised principally of the
partnership business, it becomes evident that none of the ultimate owners
is personally liable for business debts and that a practical equivalent of
limited liability exists. Furthermore, there is no reason to regard transferability
of the general partnership interest as being relevant when the corporation
acting as general partner is little more than a conduit for its shareholders to
invest in the partnership. If the limited partnership interests and the shares
of the general partner are freely transferable, the partnership should be
deemed to possess the corporate characteristic of free transferability of interests. In sum, a corporate general partner's lack of substantial net worth
apart from its partnership interest creates practical equivalents of three and
sometimes of all four relevant characteristics.
Some of the mechanics of the net worth tests of the Procedure are not
so easy to rationalize, however. Why should the net worth of the general
partner be compared to the aggregate of the contributions of the partners?' 91
The analysis suggested here, if it is the rationale underlying the tests, would
be better served by basing the net worth tests on the relative values of the
general partnership interest and the remaining net assets of the general
partner. The Procedure probably adopts the only comparison which can be
applied without resolving factual questions of the sort not appropriately
determined in advance rulings proceedings. 192 However, a test which is readily
applied but is not relevant to the underlying policies is not a good test.
Furthermore, there is no apparent reason for requiring a corporate general
partner's net worth to be a larger percentage of partnership contributions
when the contributions are less than $2.5 million than when they exceed
that amount.193 The tests should either be proportional or absolute. As
presently stated, the tests discriminate arbitrarily against smaller ventures.
190. See text accompanying notes 79-82 supra.
191. The Procedure requires that the independent net worth of a general partner be
either 15 or 10% of partnership contributions. See text accompanying note 178 supra.
192. The tests applied, which depend in part on the fair market value of the assets
of a general partner other than its partnership interest, raise obvious factual questions
which are apparently avoided by conditioning rulings issued upon the accuracy of value
representations accompanying rulings requests. See Rev. Proc. 75-16, 1975-1 Cuat. BULL. 676.
However, there are few items of property of more speculative value than a general partnership of interest in a typical tax shelter limited partnership. The Service might reasonably
have concluded that a ruling conditioned on the accuracy of a representation as to the
value of a general partnership interest would be the equivalent of no rulings at all.
193. General partner net worth is generally required to be 15% of partner contributions when they total less than $2.5 million, but only 10% when they exceed that mark.
See text accompanying note 178 supra.
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There are a few construction problems which may arise in applying the
net worth tests. The tests, for example, compare the net worth of a general
partner to "the total contributions to [the] partnership."' 194 The word
"contributions" presumably refers only to consideration given by partners
for their partnership interests; amounts loaned by partners to a partnership
will probably be ignored. If services or property other than cash is contributed
to a partnership, the value of the contribution when made should be its
measure. Although the basis of property contributed to a partnership carries
over from contributing partner to partnership, 95 it is not relevant to any
conceivable policy underlying the net worth tests, and an application of the
tests using the basis of contributed property would therefore be arbitrary.
Since the tests are minimums to be met by taxpayers, the Service should
have no objection to an exclusion of the value of contributed property or
services. However, contributed property may be worth either more or less
than its basis and the Service may not acquiesce in a substitution of basis
for value in documents supporting a ruling request. 9 Except for interests in
and claims against limited partnerships, all assets of a general partner are
taken into account in computing its net worth. In many instances, the net
worth of a general partner required by the Procedure is created by shareholder contributions of their own notes to the corporation. 19 Since the notes
are not payable to or receivable from a limited partnership, the Procedure
clearly allows them to be included in determining a general partner's
net worth.'9 8 It must be remembered, however, that net worth is computed using the fair market value of corporate assets. 99 When a note is worth
less than its face amount because the obligor's ability to pay is doubtful or
because interest is provided at less than the prevailing rate, only the value,
not the face amount, will be taken into account.
The Procedure requires that the net worth tests be satisfied "at all
times." 200 The tests are, of course, conditions to be satisfied before a request
for an advance ruling will be considered, but the Procedure does not indicate
the mechanism for enforcing the tests after a ruling has been issued.201 It
also fails to state the frequency with which a corporation must prepare
financial statements to demonstrate that its net worth equals or exceeds the
prescribed minimum "at all times."
194. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 CuM. BuLL.735.
195.

INT.REV. CoDE OF 1954, §723.

196. Revenue Procedure 75-16, 1975-1 CuM. BULL. 676, requires that a statement of
the amount of all capital contributions accompany a ruling request, but gives no guidance
as to the means of measuring the amounts.
197. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 CUM. BULL. 735.
198. Livsey, Limited Partnershipswith a Sole Corporate General Partner: The Impact
of Larson and Zuckman, 54 TAxEs 132 (1976); Kanter, supra note 39, at 780.

199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Revenue Procedure 75-16, 1975-1 Cum. BULL. 676, requires that a request for a
ruling on the status of a limited partnership be accompanied with "a representation of

the net worth of the general partner(s)." The representation required apparently need
relate only to present net worth. Cf. note 202 infra.
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The Procedure does not disclose the rulings standards applied to cases
not involving corporations as sole general partners. An individual general
partner's lack of independent net worth should not be enough, standing alone,
to justify denial of a ruling.202 The net worth of an individual general
partner has no bearing upon the issues of continuity of life, centralization
of management, or transferability of interests, even if the strictures of the
regulations are relaxed. Although an individual general partner's minimal
net worth could, contrary to the present regulations, be deemed a sufficient
ground for finding limited liability, it is doubtful that limited liability alone
may be a basis for finding association status even under the broadest application of the corporate resemblance concept. For the same reasons, a ruling
should issue without regard to the net worth of a corporate general partner
if the partnership also has an individual as general partner.2 0 3
When two or more corporations serve as general partners of a limited
partnership, a favorable ruling on the tax status of the partnership should
be issued if any of the general partners satisfies the net worth tests of the
Procedure. The presence of a corporate general partner not meeting the
tests, when another does, gives no appearance of corporateness. In fact, the
Service should apply the net worth tests by aggregating the assets and liabilities
of all corporate general partners, since the division of the requisite net worth
20 4
between several corporate entities does not increase corporate resemblance.
PackageInvestments
A taxpayer seeking an advanced ruling on the status of a limited partnership whose only general partner is a corporation must also satisfy the following
rule: "The purchase of a limited partnership interest by a limited partner
[must] not entail either a mandatory or discretionary purchase or option to
purchase any type of security of the corporate general partner or its
20 5
affiliates."

202. The Service has, at least in some instances, refused to issue rulings on the status
of limited partnerships with individual general partners unless the ruling requests are
accompanied by representations that the general partners have and will continue to have
net worths in substantial amounts.
PARTNERSHIP

IN

THE LIMITED

MCDONALD,

PARTNERSHIP

AS

AN

MAKING

THE DEAL AND CREATING THE

INVESTMENT VEHICLE

40 (1970). It

is not

clear whether the representation is required to support only a ruling as to limited liability
or whether the Service has a net worth standard for individual general partners which
must always be met, even when no other corporate attributes are present.
203. It has been reported that the Service will apply the proposition stated in the
text, but only when the individual general partner or partners have "substantial means"
and are not "judgment proof." Points to Remember, 25 TAx LAWYER 180 (1971). See note

202 supra.
204. The tests were so applied prior to the issuance of the Procedure. Points to Remember, 25 TAx LAWYER 130 (1971). There is no indication of a subsequent change
in attitude.
205. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 CUM. BULL. 735. The word "affiliates" is not defined in
this context. However the 20% test as to stock ownership refers to "any affiliate as defined
in section 1504(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954." Id. Presumably the same meaning
is intended here.
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Superficially, the requirement seems supplementary to the condition proscribing limited partner ownership of more than 20 percent of the stock
of a sole general partner. 20 6 It clearly is not, however. A package joining
the purchase of limited partnership interests with rights or obligations to
acquire securities of a sole corporate general partner is sufficient ground for
denying a ruling, according to the Procedure, even though limited partners
may never own more than 20 percent of the stock of the general partner.
Also, the package rule is applied with respect to all securities of the general
partner, not only its stock. In applying the 20 percent test, stock of a
general partner subject to a package purchase is included in computing
limited partner ownership of the general partner, independently of the package rule.207 The package rule therefore is not a satellite of the 20 percent
test and must find its conceptual justification elsewhere. Can the combining
of purchases of limited partnership interests with rights or obligations to
acquire securities of a sole corporate general partner be reasonably viewed as
causing a limited partnership to resemble a corporation more than a partnership, even though limited partners may never own more than 20 percent
of the stock of the general partner?
The package rule may be based on a belief that such a combination is
evidence that a limited partnership lacks independent substance and is in
reality an arm of its general partner. Assume, for example, that a corporation
desires to raise additional capital to finance an extension of its activities
which is likely to operate at a loss for a few years. It organizes a limited
partnership to undertake the new venture and agrees to serve as its only
general partner. The needed capital is raised by selling investment units
comprised of one unit of limited partnership interest and one share of the
general partner's stock. The limited partnership interests entitle the limited
partners to share in profits and losses only and expire after a fixed number
of years. It is expected that the partnership will be liquidated when the
limited partnership interests expire. The scheme just suggested, if governed
by tax rules recognizing the form of the transactions, would enable the new
investors to share in the deduction of start up losses of the new venture, even
though their investments are primarily purchases of interests in the corporation.
In such a case and in any other situation in which limited partnership
interests are incidental to investments in securities of a sole corporate general
partner, the partnership can reasonably be ignored as lacking independent
substance. The rulings policy reflected in the package rule may be intended
to do just that.
206. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 CuM. BULL.735.
207. The ownership test is met only if "[t]he limited partners will not own . . .
more than 20 percent of the stock of the corporate general partner...." Id. (emphasis
added). The use of the future tense includes within the rule any stock a limited partner is
obligated to acquire in the future as well as stock presently owned. Furthermore, stock
ownership is determined for purposes of the 20% test by applying "the attribution rules
set forth in section 318 of the Code." Id. Section 318(a)(4) regards a person as the owner
of stock he has an option to acquire. Hence, all stock which is or may be purchased under
the terms of a package investment is included in applying the 20% ownership test and
would be so included even if the package rule were deleted from the Procedure.
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There are a few problems in the application of the package rule. It
forbids, for example, the tying of purchases of limited partnership interests
to present or future acquisitions of "any type of security" of a corporate
general partner.2 0 The word "security" is evidently intended to encompass
9
debt obligations of a general partner as well as all types of stock.20 Short
term debt obligations may not be included, however. It seems likely that the
policy underlying the package rule, whatever it might be, would justify only
a prohibition of long term investments in a general partner. A requirement
that a purchaser of a limited partnership interest make a short term loan
to a general partner would not seem to create any corporate resemblance
210
or cause the limited partnership to lack independent substance.
The rule requires that the purchase of a limited partnership interest "not
entail either a mandatory or discretionary purchase or option to purchase"
a security of a general partner.2 11 It therefore encompasses package offerings
in which limited partners are required to purchase securities of a general
partner presently or in the future, in which a general partner's securities
are offered as optional additions to limited partnership investments, or in
which warrants or options to acquire a general partner's securities are issued
with limited partnership interests. A package investment program should not
lead to the conclusion that a limited partnership lacks independent substance
unless the securities of the general partner are the principal ingredient in
a package and limited partnership interests are incidental. However, the
Service cannot be expected to rule in advance whether one part of a package
or another is its mainstay.
The policies underlying the package rule may also apply to cases other
than those in which corporations are sole general partners. The presence of
a second corporate general partner in which limited partners have no interest
or the presence of an individual as general partner in addition to a corporation would not insure that a package purchase is not principally an investment in securities of a general partner. Since the determination of the primary
ingredient of an investment package is a factual matter not appropriate for
resolution in an advance ruling, the Service may apply the package rule in
all cases in which a corporation is a general partner in a limited partnership.

208. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 CUM. BULL. 735.
209. The use of the word "stock" in describing the 20% ownership test, implied
that the word "security" in another part of the Procedure includes more than stock.
210. The proposition stated in text, if accepted, requires definition of what is
meant by "short term." The word "securities" as appearing in §§351 and 354 of the Code
is generally construed as not including obligations whose terms are five years or less. Bonds
and notes with terms of more than ten years are usually deemed securities for that purpose,
whereas a term of five to ten years leaves an obligation in an undefined hiatus. B. Britrax
& J. EusTicE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, 3.04 (3d ed.
1971). The definition of "securities" so developed, although lacking in complete certainty,
would provide a convenient reference here.
211. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 Cum. BULL. 735.
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Conformity with State Law
The final condition of Revenue Procedure 72-13 states that a limited
partnership with a corporation as sole general partner will be treated as a
partnership for advance ruling purposes only if "the organization and operawith the applicable state
tion of the limited partnership [is] in accordance
212
statute relating to limited partnerships.
The justification for the condition is unexplained. A failure to adhere to
limited partnership restrictions will sometimes make an organization a general
partnership under state law. 213 The Service should not be reluctant to rule
a general partnership to be a partnership for tax purposes even though
its partners had hoped it was a limited partnership. However, there may be
instances in which nonconformance with limited partnership statutes would
give a partnership features resembling corporate characteristics. Perhaps the
condition stated in the Procedure means only that in passing upon ruling
requests the Service will not determine the consequences under state law of
deviations from statutes regulating the limited partnership form of organization.
The policy served by the condition probably is not unique to partner-

ships with sole corporate general partners. The condition may therefore be
applied whenever a ruling as to the tax status of a limited partnership is
sought.

RE ENUE PROCEDURE 74-17
Revenue Procedure 74-17214 added height to the wall to be scaled by taxpayers seeking advance rulings on the tax status of limited partnerships.
Ordinarily no ruling will issue, according to the Procedure, unless the distributive shares of the general partners include at least one percent of each item
of partnership income, gain, loss, deduction or credit.215 Distributive shares
of partnership loss claimed by partners as deductions in the first two years
of a partnership's operation ordinarily may not exceed the capital contributions of the partners. 21 6 And, persons making nonrecourse loans to the partnership ordinarily may not have any interest in the partnership or its property
217
other than as creditors.

Apart from the content of the rules stated, Revenue Procedure 74-17
reflects an approach differing in several respects from that of Revenue Procedure 72-13. Whereas the earlier procedure applies by its terms -only when
a corporation is the sole general partner of a limited partnership, 218 for
example, the rules of Revenue Procedure74-17 apply to all limited partner2 19
ships, whether their general partners are individuals or corporations. Also,
212. Id.
note 24, at 164-67.

213.

CIANE & BROMBERG, supra

214.

1974-1 CuM. BULL. 438.

215.
216.
217.
218.

Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 CuM. BuLL. 438.
Id.
Id.
Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 Cum. BuLL. 735.

219. Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 Cum. BULL. 438.
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the rules of Revenue Procedure 74-17 are not derived from the association
concept. Although a failure to comply with the rules will ordinarily result
220
in a denial of a request for a ruling that a partnership is not an association,
the basis of the denial will be that the failure to comply suggests the organization of the partnership "has as its principal purpose the reduction of Federal
taxes." 221 The propriety of denying rulings on that broad ground is far from
clear. The role of the rules is further confused by a statement that they
"are not intended as substantive rules for the determination of partnership
status and are not to be applied as criteria for the audit of taxpayers' re222
turns."
Presumably the Procedure was not promulgated to erect a series of hurdles
to be overcome by taxpayers seeking rulings, but which have no relation to
the legal principles determining tax liability. The Procedure was probably
issued to delineate certain perimeters beyond which lie questions of fact not
appropriate for determination in the advance rulings process. The relevant
questions of fact are not described in the ruling, however, except by implication. Furthermore, a question of fact is a relevant question only if there
is a rule of law making it so. The legal principles underlying the rules of
Revenue Procedure 74-17 are not stated there and have not been suggested
by any prior or subsequent pronouncement of the Service. There are provisions of the Code denying certain deductions and allowances when transactions are motivated by tax avoidance purposes, 223 but none of them relates
in any perceivable way to the factors identified in the Procedure. The courts
have long held that the tax consequences of transactions are to be determined
by their economic substances and not necessarily by the forms in which they
are cast.2 24 However, the Procedure does not suggest that its rules are based
upon that doctrine alone. The Procedure, like Revenue Procedure 72-13,
reminds one of a parent who says to his child: "You do it as I say and
don't you dare ask why you should or what will happen to you if you don't."
Minimum Interest of GeneralPartners
The rule of Revenue Procedure 74-17 relating to the interests of general
partners is stated as follows:
The interests of all of the general partners, taken together, in
each material item of partnership income, gain, loss, deduction or
credit [must be] equal to at least one percent of each such item at all
times during the existence of the partnership. In determining the

220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Section 269(a) is probably the best known example of such a
the benefit of any deduction, credit or allowance when the shares
corporation are acquired for the principal purpose of avoiding tax
benefit. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §269(a). See also INT. REV. CODE
704(b)(2), 877(a), 954(b)(4).
224. See, e.g., Gregory v. -elvering, 293 U.S. 465, 1935-1 U.S.T.C.
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general partners' interests in such items, limited partnership interests
25
owned by the general partners shall not be taken into account.
One commentator has suggested that the rule is an outgrowth of the
association concept. 228 If a general partner has no substantial interest in the
profits and losses of a partnership, it is argued, he is not truly associated with
the other partners in carrying on a business for joint profit and is therefore
seen by the Service as not being a partner. When a limited partnership is
viewed as comprised solely of its limited partners, its resemblance to a
corporation is very close indeed. The explanation suggested is probably the
only one available, but is somewhat less than convincing. The rule, if derived
from the association concept, is not consistent with the regulations. The substantiality of the interests of general partners is put at issue by the regulations
in their description of only two corporate characteristics, centralization of
management 227 and free transferability of interests. 22 Since an entity with
only two corporate characteristics is not an association under the regulations, 229 the insubstantiality of a general partner's interest alone will not
support a finding of association status under the regulation tests. The Tax
23 0
Court so held in Phillip G. Larson.
Furthermore, if the insubstantiality of a general partner's interest is a
ground for disregarding his presence as a partner, it is surprising that the
Service would concede that a one percent interest is always enough to make
him a partner in substance. 231 Also, a general partner is personally liable for
partnership debts even though his partnership interest is insubstantial. When
partnership activities create significant financial risks to the general partners,
it does not seem reasonable to treat them as not being participants in the
venture merely because their interests in profits and losses are not a substantial part of the total. When a general partner lacks a significant interest
in profits and losses, on the other hand, the issue of whether his personal
liability is of sufficient importance to make him a partner in substance is a
question of fact. The rule stated in the Procedure may be justified as a
statement that the question of fact is not one appropriately resolved by an
advance ruling.
The Procedure will deny advance rulings, however, in many cases in
which the interests of general partners are substantial. It requires that general
partners have a one percent interest in each material item of income, deduction or credit. A lack of an interest in one class of items will preclude an
advance ruling, even though general partners have substantial interests in
225. Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 Cum. BULL. 438, 439.
226. Livsey, Limited Partnerships:How Far Can IRS Go in Limiting Their Use in
Tax Shelters?, 39 J. TAx 123 (1973).
227. TarAs. R1EG. §301.7701-2(c)(4).
228. Id. §301.7701-2(e)(1).
229. Id. §301.7701-2(a)(3).
230. Phillip G. Larson, 66 T.C. No. 21 (Apr. 27, 1976).
231. Prior to the issuance of the Procedure it was rumored that the Service insisted
that general partners have a five percent interest in each item of income, deduction and
credit. Kanter supra note 39, at 780.
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most items. The Service could perhaps support the application of the rulings
policy to such cases by pointing out that it cannot reasonably be expected to
determine by an advance ruling whether an interest is substantial on the
whole when it does not include a distributive share of some items and the
232
importance of the excluded items cannot be predicted with certainty.
It is likely that the principal targets of the rule are arrangements that
divert losses to limited partners but that plainly provide substantial interests
to general partners in gains and profits. A real estate tax shelter, for example,
generates substantial loss deductions in the early years of the venture. The
losses, which derive from. interest on construction loans and accelerated depreciation, typically decline in succeeding years and the investment eventually
yields taxable income if it is reasonably successful. When such a shelter is
organized as a limited partnership, the loss deductions are a primary incentive for limited partners to invest. The general partners may have little
independent income against which loss deductions may be taken. In such cases
limited partnership agreements frequently allocate all profits and losses to
limited partners for the periods losses are projected to occur and allow
general partners to share in profits and losses to a significant extent during
later periods when profits are anticipated. Gains from the sale of partnership
assets are often shared by general and limited partners whenever they are
realized. The purpose of the arrangement is to allocate losses to the partners
who can best use them as deductions. Because it allocates no items of income
or loss to general partners in the early years, the arrangement does not satisfy
Revenue Procedure 74-17.
A diversion of losses away from general partners does not reduce their
financial interests. If the Service's policy was only to insist that the interests
of general partners be substantial, it would require that they participate
meaningfully in items of income, gain and credit, the financial benefits, but
would ignore the allocation of deductions and losses, the financial detriments,
which are given a glamour only by the tax laws. If the rule of the Procedure
is directed principally at. loss sharing arrangements, it is not intended as a
233
requirement that general partners participate meaningfully as partners.
Losses are shifted to limited partners, of course, to reduce taxes. If the
law frustrates the tax avoidance motive, however, it does not do so by
classifying partnerships as associations. Section 704(b) of the Code provides
that a partner's distributive share of income, loss or credit is to be determined
232. Failure to satisfy the rule does not preclude the issuance of a ruling, since
the Procedure describes cases in which the Service "ordinarily" will not rule. Rev. Proc.
74-17, 1974-1 CuM. BULL. 438. A ruling may therefore be issued when general partners
share to the extent of at least one percent in all items excepting some which dearly will
not be substantial.
233. Another common arrangement, that which excludes general partners from sharing
profits and losses but provides general partners with compensation for their services
determined independently of profits and losses, raises greater doubt as to the substantiality
of general partners' participation as partners. If such arrangements are the principal
target of the rule, however, the Service should not require an allocation of losses to
general partners, since the interests of a general partner can be made substantial by
causing him to share in profits only.
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by an overall evaluation of the extent of his interest whenever "the allocation
to a partner under the agreement of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit
(or item thereof) does not have substantial economic effect." 23 4 When a loss
sharing arrangement has substantial economic effect, any tax avoidance resulting from its operation is, by negative implication, authorized by section
704(b). The Service should not interfere with the operation of the statute
by denying a ruling on an unrelated issue such as the classification of the
23 5
partnership.
Maximum Deduction of PartnershipLosses
A limited partnership ordinarily will not be given advance assurance that
it will be treated as a partnership for tax purposes if it fails to satisfy the
following rule relating to partnership losses: "The aggregate deductions to be
claimed by the partners as their distributive shares of partnership losses for
the first two years of operation of the limited partnership [must] not exceed
the amount of equity capital invested in the limited partnership." 236
The rule probably derives from a belief that an excess of losses over
equity contributions in the first two years of a venture's existence raises
doubt as to whether it is carried on for profit. Such an excess cannot be
taken as conclusive evidence of the intentions motivating a venture, of course.
Substantial losses must often be incurred to bring a new endeavor into a
healthy existence. And, tax shelter investments are usually structured to take
advantage of tax accounting rules which provide a poor measure of the
economic viability of the investments.237 However, the Service cannot be
criticized for declining to rule in advance that a profit motive exists when
start-up losses, even though determined under artificial accounting rules,
will quickly exceed equity invested.
It is less clear, however, that the lack of a profit motive is a valid basis
for denying a ruling that an entity is a partnership for tax purposes. The
Code defines a partnership as an organization which carries on "any business,
financial operation, or venture" which is not encompassed by the tax defini234. The language quoted was added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976. At the time
Revenue Procedure 74-17 was promulgated, §704(b) stated in relevant part that any agreement for sharing specific items of income, loss, deduction or credit would be ignored

when the principal purpose of the agreement was "the avoidance or evasion of any tax
imposed by this subtitle." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §704(b). When the provision applied,
items covered by a tainted agreement were allocated by the general income and loss
sharing arrangement of the partner. In 1974 there was no statutory provision requiring

revision of a general income and loss sharing arrangement adopted for a tax avoidance
purpose.
285. At the time Revenue Procedure 74-17 was issued, the scope of §704(b) was much
narrower than at present. The point made in the text was, however, valid even then.
To the extent the law in 1974 permitted tax avoidance by economically meaningless
arrangements for sharing losses, the defect was in the restricted scope of §704(b) and was
not related to the association issue. The Service acted arbitrarily in promulgating Revenue
Procedure 74-17 if its purpose was to deny rulings on the association issue to taxpayers
availing themselves of other provisions of law which it regarded as loopholes.
236. Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 CuM. BULL. 438, 439.
237. See text accompanying notes 6-10 supra.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1976

43

Florida Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

tions of corporation, trust or estate.23 8 Neither the Code nor the regulations -39
require that a partnership be carried on for profit.2 40 A tax shelter package,
although organized principally to generate losses deductible against other
income of investors, is a "business, financial operation, or venture" if those
words are given their common meanings. And the lack of a profit motive
certainly does not make an organization a corporation 2 41 trust or estate.
Furthermore, the law provides a tool for denying loss deductions to investors not seeking profit which seems to negate any implication that the
entity definitions are intended to be used for that purpose. Section 183 of
the Code provides that most expenses incurred in an activity not carried on
for profit are allowed as deductions only to the extent of gross income derived
from the activity. 42
Although section 183 states it applies only to individuals
and subchapter S corporations, 24 3 the taxable income of a partnership is
generally determined by the rules applicable to individuals.2 44 It would be
better if the Service applied section 183 in the audit of limited partnership
returns and simply ignored the question of profit motivation in passing on
requests for rulings as to the status of such entities.
The loss rule of Revenue Procedure 74-17 is also lacking in clarity. The
rule, like the others stated in the Procedure, "must be contained in relevant
documents furnished with the request for ruling."' 5 As applied to the loss
rule, the quoted language apparently requires a taxpayer requesting a ruling
to furnish projections of the income and deductions of the limited partnership for its first two years that show the rule will likely be satisfied.24 The
Service may also insist that a partnership receiving a ruling formally undertake to adopt the depreciation and other accounting methods used in preparing the projections.24 A statement in a partnership agreement that losses
may not exceed equity in the first two years would be meaningless. A deductible loss is an excess of deductions allowed by law over gross income.248
238. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§761(a), 7701(a)(2).
239. TREAS. REG. §§1.761-1(a), 301.7701-3.
240. The UPA defines a partnership as "an association of two or more persons to
carry on as co-owners a business for profit." UPA §6(1). The tax definitions of "partnership"
quite clearly include organizations which are not partnerships under local law, however.
TREAS. REG. §§1.761-1(a), 301.7701-3(a).
241. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 356, 1936-1 U.S.T.C. ]]9020, at 9244-45
(1935), held that the word "association" in the statutory definition of corporation "implies
the entering into a joint enterprise, and . . .an enterprise for the transaction of business."
242. The rule does not apply to interest, taxes and other expenditures which are
deductible even when paid as personal living expenses. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §183(b)(1).
243. Id. §183(a).
244. Id. §703(a). Because §641(b) requires that the taxable income of a trust or estate
be computed as though it were an individual, the regulations provide that §183 applies
to trusts and estates. TREAS. REG. §1.183-1(a). Although the regulations do not refer to
partnerships, the same reasoning should apply to them.
245. Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 CuM. BULL. 438.
246. However, Revenue Procedure 75-16, 1975-1 Cum. BULL. 676, which lists certain
items to be included with a request for a ruling on the status of a limited partnership,
does not require that such projections be furnished.
247. Revenue Procedure 75-16, id., does not require that such an undertaking accompany
a ruling request, however.

248.

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, §§63, 703(a).
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Although a loss is generally apportioned among the distributive shares of
partners in accordance with the partnership agreement, 249 the amount of the
loss is determined not by the agreement but by law.
The "equity capital invested in the limited partnership 250 which may
not be exceeded by losses in the first two years presumably equals the capital
contributions of the partners. Amounts that partners have loaned to the
partnership will not be taken into account. Distributions made by a partnership may decrease invested equity if not deemed made from profits, and
profits will probably be determined for this purpose by the tax accounting
rules used by the partnership. When services or property other than cash is
contributed, the fair market value of the services or property when contributed
should be included as "equity capital invested." 251 A partner's basis for
contributed property, although it usually becomes the partnership's basis
for the property, 25 2 would be an arbitrary measure of the extent of the partnership's capitalization. However, the Service ordinarily will not rule on issues
turning on questions of valuation.253 Therefore, the position of the Service
may be that only cash contributions are taken into account in applying the
25 4
loss rule.
The loss rule is applied by comparing aggregate partnership losses in the
relevant period to aggregate equity capital of a partnership. 2 5 The statutes
do not require that partners share partnership profits and losses in proportion
to their capital contributions.256 Although the rule first stated in Revenue
Procedure 74-17 requires that general partners be allocated at least one
percent of partnership losses, 257 it does not demand that their distributive
shares of such losses be proportionate to their contributions. When more
than one percent of the equity capital of a limited partnership is supplied by
general partners, the profit and loss sharing agreement of the partners may
therefore allocate losses to limited partners in the initial two years which
exceed their equity contributions.
Furthermore, there is no indication that the loss rule will affect activities
of a partnership undertaken after its second year of operation. Assume a
limited partnership is formed to engage in a real estate project to be completed in stages over a period of years. It employs the straight line method
of depreciation with respect to portions of the project completed during the
first two years and thereby satisfies the loss rule of Revenue Procedure 74-17.
An advance ruling will apparently issue declaring the entity to be a partnership for tax purposes, even though accelerated methods of depreciation em249.
250.

Id. §704(a). Cf. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §704(b).
Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 Cum. Buu.. 438.

251. Id.
252. Ir. Rnv.

CODE OF 1954, §723.
253. Rev. Proc. 72-9, 1972-1 Cum. BuLL. 719.
254. Alternatively, taxpayers submitting representations as to the value of contributed
property may be issued rulings conditioned on the representations subsequently being
determined to be accurate.

255. Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 CuM. BuLL. 438.
256. See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §704.
257. Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 CuM. BuLL. 438.
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ployed with respect to subsequently acquired properties produce loss deductions in the third and fourth years exceeding equity capital. If later acquisitions are financed in part by the admission of new limited partners, the added
partners will obtain benefits equivalent to those provided by a limited
partnership organized in contravention of the loss rule.
In terests of Nonrecourse Lenders
The third rule of Revenue Procedure 74-17 is stated as follows:
A creditor who makes a nonrecourse loan to the limited partnership
must not have or acquire at any time as a result of making the loan,
any direct or indirect interest in the profits, capital, or258property of the
limited partnership other than as a secured creditor.
A quirk in the law has made nonrecourse loans the backbone of the
financing of many tax shelter ventures organized as limited partnerships.
Tax shelters are typically structured to generate loss deductions exceeding
the equities of the investors.259 A partner is allowed to deduct his distributive
share of partnership losses, however, only to the extent of the basis of his
partnership interest. 260 An excess of losses over equity investments may not
be deducted by partners, therefore, unless the bases of their interests are
larger than their capital contributions. When a partnership interest is purchased for cash, the amount paid is the initial basis of the interest. 261 However,
section 752(a) of the Code provides in effect that the basis of a partner's
interest is increased by his share of partnership liabilities. 262 Since partners
are usually personally liable for partnership debts, section 752(a) is a fitting
corollary to the general. principle that the basis of property includes, in
addition to the down payment made to acquire it, all amounts which must
be paid in the future to obtain unencumbered ownership of the property. 26
Because the rule of section 752(a) derives from the personal liabilities of
partners for partnership debts and because limited partners are not so
burdened, 2 - the regulations under section 752(a) provide that liabilities incurred by limited partnerships usually increase the bases of general partners

258. Id.
259. If a tax shelter operates as a deferral device, the loss deductions, which are
generally concentrated in the early years of the venture, are made up in later years when
taxable income may substantially exceed cash flow. See text accompanying notes 7-11 supra.
260. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §704(d).
261. Id. §722. When property other than cash is contributed to a partnership in
exchange for a partnership interest, the adjusted basis of the contributed property is
the initial basis of the partnership interest. Id.
262, Section 752(a) states that "any increase in a partner's share of the liabilities of a
partnership . . . shall be considered as a contribution of money by such partner to the
partnership." Id. §752(a). A partner's basis for his interest in a partnership is the sum
of the money he contributes and the adjusted basis of contributed property other than

money. Id. §722.
263.
264.

Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 47-1 U.S.T.C.
ULPA §7.
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only.265 The rationale supporting the rules breaks down when no partner,
general or limited, has personal liability for certain obligations of a limited
partnership. The Treasury concluded that the mandate of section 752(a)
applies to such liabilities, however, and the regulations therefore provide
that a partnership liability for which no partner is personally liable increases
the bases of all partners, including limited partners, in proportion to their
interests in profits of the partnership. 266 The Tax Reform Act of 1976 largely
overruled the regulation rule and the basis of a partnership interest now is
usually computed without taking nonrecourse liabilities into account. 26 There
are significant exceptions to the 1976 change, however. For example, it does
not apply to any partnership the principal activity of which is investing in
real property (other than mineral property). 26 In cases encompassed by any
exception to the new rule, limited partners may deduct partnership losses in
amounts exceeding their capital contributions if, but only if, the partnerships
have liabilities for which no general partner is personally liable. Partnerships have acquired such liabilities by purchasing property subject to liabilities
without assuming them, or by obtaining loans directly from lenders agreeing
to look solely to partnership assets for satisfaction of their claims. Such
liabilities are commonly referred to as nonrecourse loans.
Prior to the appearance of Revenue Procedure 74-17, the Service issued
two rulings relating to nonrecourse loans made by persons having present
or potential equity interests in the debtor partnerships. Revenue Ruling
72-135269 held that a nonrecourse loan to a limited partnership made by one
of its general partners was to be treated as a capital contribution by the purported lender. Revenue Ruling 72-350270 held that a nonrecourse lender who
had the right to convert his claim into a profits interest was also to be treated
as having made a capital investment rather than a loan. The rulings are at
least arguably correct. Recourse against partners personally is a customary
characteristic of partnership debt. When a purported creditor does not have
that right, but does have a present or potential interest in partnership profits,
his status closely resembles that of a partner.27 '
265.

More specifically, the regulations state that a limited partner's share of partner-

ship liabilities generally may not exceed the contributions he is obligated to make in the
future. TRxAS. MEG. §1.752-1(e). When no capital contributions are required of limited
partners after their initial contributions, as is commonly the case, a limited partner's
share of liabilities under this rule is zero.
266. Id.
267. INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, §704(d).
268. Id.
269. 1972-1 Cutt. BULL. 200. The ruling also held that a general partner's nonrecourse

loan to a limited partner of cash contributed by the limited partner to the partnership,
was to be treated as a capital contribution to the partnership by the general partner, not
the limited partner.
270. 1972-2 Cutm. BuL.. 384.
271. There are cases holding that the debt versus equity issue is to be resolved in a
partnership context by applying the rules developed for determining whether purported
debt of corporations is true debt or equity. See, e.g., Joseph W. Hambuechen, 43 T.C. 90

(1964). Those rules turn on factors not mentioned in the rulings and would not justify the
& J. Eusircx, supra note 210, at
categorical position taken in the rulings. See B. BrrrKs

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1976

47

Florida Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

When a nonrecourse loan is characterized as a capital contribution, the
amount of the loan is added to the basis of the purported lender for his
partnership interest, and, because no partnership liability is incurred, the
bases of the other partners are unaffected. 272 For a nonrecourse loan to
provide a foundation supporting loss deductions by limited partners in excess
of their capital contributions, in sum, the loan must be treated as debt
rather than as equity. An unsuccessful attempt at that goal, however, does
not affect the status of the purported debtor as a partnership. Therefore, prior
rulings do not provide a justification for the nonrecourse debt test of Revenue
Procedure 74-17 since the sole consequence of a failure to satisfy that test is
a denial of a request for ruling classifying an entity as a partnership.
Furthermore, the test established by the Procedure is not coterminous
with the holdings of the prior rulings. The test of the Procedure only precludes the acquisition of interests by a nonrecourse lender "as a result of
making [his] loan."273 Therefore, it is less broad than Revenue Ruling
72-135, 274 which would characterize a purported loan as equity when it is
made by a general partner independently of the transaction in which his
general partnership interest was acquired. The Procedure, on the other hand,
refers to "any direct or indirect interest in the profits, capital, or property of
the limited partnership other than as a secured creditor." 2' 7 5 It may apply to
nonrecourse loans bearing interest contingent on profits even though the
lender is not a partner and has no right to convert his interest into a partnership interest.
CONCLUSION

There is much to criticize in the opinions of the Tax Court and the
Court of Claims in Phillip G. Larson27 6 and Zuckman v. United States.2 7 7 To

cite but a few examples, a limited partnership should be deemed to have
continuity of life when it is organized in a manner greatly reducing the
chances of termination contrary to the will of the majority, should be deemed
to have centralization of management when its sole general partner is a
corporation controlled by persons owning nearly all limited partnership interests, and should be deemed to have limited liability when its corporate
general partner has no substantial assets. There is also much to commend
in the rules stated in Revenue Procedure 72-13Y.27 The mechanical counting
of corporate characteristics demanded by the regulations perhaps serves the
need for certainty but requires that an exorbitant price be paid through its
sacrifice of rationality. In some cases a single fact should be sufficient to
4.03-4.06 (3d ed. 1971). However, the debt versus equity cases decided in the partnership context have not involved loans made without recourse against other partners.
272. Rev. Rul. 72-350, 1972-2 CuM. BULL. 394.
273. Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 CuM. BULL. 438.
274. 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 200.
275. Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 CuM. BULL. 438.
276. 66 T.C. No. 21 (Apr. 27, 1976).
277. 524 F.2d 729, 75-2 U.S.T.C. %9778(Ct. Cl. 1975).
278. 1972-1 Cum. BULL. 735.
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justify association classification. For example, a limited partnership is
practically indistinguishable from a corporation when its corporate general
partner either is a creature of the limited partners or has no substantial
net worth apart from interests in the partnership. The results in the Larson
and Zuckman cases, however, seem unavoidable under the regulations presently
in force, and any litigating position based upon the policies reflected in
Revenue Procedure 72-13 is doomed to defeat so long as the current regulations exist.
There are only two meaningful choices left to the Treasury in the matter:
It can amend its regulations or it can concede that all limited partnerships
properly organized under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act are to be
treated as partnerships for tax purposes. The former is the preferable alternative. In Morrissey v. Commissioner the Supreme Court said, "The inclusion
of associations implies resemblance; but it is resemblance and not identity. ' 279
If a limited partnership can ever be an association under the current regulations, it is only when the partnership functions in a manner virtually identical
to the operation of a corporation. Consideration of practical equivalence is
generally foreclosed by the regulations. A limited partnership does not have
continuity of life, for example, if it is properly organized under the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act, and that is so under the regulations even though the
possibilities for premature termination have been made remote contingencies.
The regulations seem to say that no limited partnership has limited liability,
even though many of them are structured to create a practical equivalent
of the laws insulating shareholders from liability. Until the regulations are
amended, the limited partnership will stand as a form which can be freely
elected whenever the state law advantages of incorporation are desired to
be combined with the tax rules applied to partnerships.
279. 296 U.S. 344, 357, 1936-1 U.S.T.C.

9020, at 9245 (1935).
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